Category Archives: democracy

Moldovan President Igor Dodon Suspended by the Constitutional Court

The Moldovan Constitutional Court temporarily suspended the country’s president, on October 20, following a request by the government to interpret article 98, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, covering the president’s role in government reshuffles (Constcourt.md, October 20). The issue dates back to December 27, 2016, when the office of the minister of defense became vacant after then-minister Anatol Salaru was dismissed by the newly inaugurated President Igor Dodon. The Liberal Party, at that point a member of the ruling coalition, withdrew its political support for Salaru, and the government initiated the dismissal, which was eagerly accepted by Dodon. However, the president refused to appoint then–environment minister Valeriu Munteanu, another Liberal Party appointee, to fill the vacancy at the top of the defense ministry. The inter-institutional deadlock was immediately addressed by the Constitutional Court on January 24, 2017. On that date, the Court ruled that a president can only decline a prime minister’s proposal for a government reshuffle once, but it did not elaborate on what happens if the president refuses to accept a cabinet nomination for a second time (Constcourt.md, January 24).

The Democratic Party–controlled government never went ahead with nominating Valeriu Munteanu for a second time. Meanwhile, the Liberal Party withdrew from the ruling coalition in May and was replaced by a group of Liberal Democratic Party defectors, under the leadership of former prime minister Iurie Leanca, who became deputy speaker of Parliament on June 2. The European People’s Party of Moldova, headed by Leanca, nominated its vice president and Leanca’s former chief of staff, Eugen Sturza, to become minister of defense. However, the public announcement came from the Democratic Party chairman, Vlad Plahotniuc, on September 12. President Dodon rejected the nomination the following day, citing Sturza’s lack of experience in the defense sector and the nominee’s questionable integrity. Instead, Dodon proposed former defense minister Victor Gaiciuc (2001–2004), who also served as Moldova’s ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during former Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin’s second term (Zdg.md, September 13). The government insisted on Sturza, but President Dodon rejected his nomination again on September 18 (Unimedia.info, September 18). The following day, the government appealed to the Constitutional Court for a way out of this deadlock.

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The Court issued a highly controversial ruling on October 17, mandating that if the head of state refuses to carry out his constitutional duties by rejecting a cabinet nomination twice, this represents grounds for his or her temporary suspension from office (Constcourt.md, October 17). Two days later, the government asked the Constitutional Court to temporarily suspend the president, which it did on October 20 (Constcourt.md, October 20). Under the Court’s ruling, the president’s suspension will be in force until an acting president appoints a new defense minister—despite the fact that no such provisions exist in Moldova’s Constitution. Article 89 of the Constitution clearly states that a president can only be suspended from office if he or she has violated the Constitution. One third of the members of the parliament need to initiate the suspension, and two thirds of the legislators need to vote in favor for the suspension to be approved; only the citizens can remove the president from office in a national referendum (Presedinte.md, accessed October 24). Ironically, the government acknowledges in its referral to the Court that, despite President Dodon having violated the Constitution, “a referendum is too difficult to achieve” and “it does not guarantee a solution to the deadlock” (ConstCourt.md, September 19), meaning that a recall referendum against Dodon is likely to fail. The absurdity of the situation is that Dodon’s fellow Socialists agree that the president has violated the Constitution and Dodon himself openly calls for a referendum (RTR Moldova, October 20). Nonetheless, the Democratic Party pulled an ace from its sleeve, as the Constitutional Court equated Dodon’s brazen refusal to carry out his duty with a president’s inability to do so—a provision normally covering health-related impediments.

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The present situation is not the first time Moldova’s Constitutional Court has engaged in similar far-reaching judicial activism. In fact, Dodon owes his presidency to a highly controversial ruling that reintroduced direct presidential elections in March 2016 (see EDM, March 8, 2016). Another watershed decision was the banning, in April 2013, of then–prime minister Vlad Filat from being reappointed to head the cabinet based on allegations of corruption (RFE/RL, April 23, 2013). This time, Dodon attempted to give the Court a taste of its own medicine, alleging that Eugen Sturza, a former Filat advisor, was also corrupt, but to no avail. The Constitutional Court’s refusal to entertain such charges has strengthened critics’ accusations that Moldova’s highest court currently serves the interests of one person—oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. Though, it may seem as if this latest court ruling undermines the tacit Plahotniuc-Dodon power-sharing agreement (Jamestown.org, March 23), in fact, the Plahotniuc-controlled government did Dodon a favor by allowing him to save face by virtue of not taking part in this cabinet appointment. Some are even predicting that this controversial ruling could be used to make Plahotniuc prime minister without Dodon having to take the blame for it (Deutsche Welle—Romanian version, October 18; Trb.ro, October 20).

Meanwhile, on October 24, Sturza was sworn in as defense minister by Parliamentary Speaker and Acting President Andrian Candu, thus ending President Dodon’s suspension. Still, there is hardly any major political party, other than the Socialists, willing to defend Dodon against this attack on presidential powers that undermines the few remaining checks and balances in the Moldovan political system. Moldova’s highly polarized politics notwithstanding, Dodon and Plahotniuc are both fully complicit when it comes to the most dramatic case of democratic backsliding in Moldova’s recent history—the change of the electoral system (see EDM, July 25). Ultimately, how Dodon reacts to this latest challenge to his constitutional powers could either make or break his presidency. So far, he has vaguely threatened to initiate a popular movement in favor of “early parliamentary elections and transition to a presidential form of government” (Presedinte.mdNewsmaker.md, October 18). Yet, regardless of what the president does, Plahotniuc is now in an even stronger position to further consolidate his grip on power.

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Note: This article was written for the Washington based Jamestown Foundation and the original can be accessed here.

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Don’t give up on democracy in Moldova

My country was once a leader in democratic transition in the post-Soviet space. It had high hopes of joining the European family of nations as the poster child of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership programme. This has proven to be an illusion. Despite struggling with corruption and poor governance, political pluralism and independent media are a cherished achievement of Moldova’s young and feeble democracy. But even these achievements are coming to an end.

Moldova is now a captured state that needs to be returned to its citizens. One politician, whose party received less than 16% of the vote in the 2014 parliamentary election, now has the dubious honor of running the entire country. Despite holding no public office, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc is now the kingpin of Moldova. He has managed to take over all of the key state institutions, including parliament, the government and the judiciary, by all the means at his disposal.

Plahotniuc’s ownership of the largest media holding in the country, coupled with his control over the nominally independent national public broadcaster, allows for his vast political influence to go completely unchecked.

Changing the rules of the game

The recent adoption of the highly controversial electoral reform and attempts to restrict the independence of civil nongovernmental organizations serve as vivid examples of Moldova’s democratic backsliding.

By changing the electoral system, Democratic Party leader Vlad Plahotniuc and pro-Russian president Igor Dodon, elected with Plahotniuc’s support, have established a de facto political cartel in order to marginalise the remaining opposition parties from political competition, even if Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party polled at just four percent in the survey conducted by the International Republic Institute last spring. The new electoral system is clearly designed to benefit the incumbent Democratic Party, which can rely on its vast resources to gain undue advantage, but it also gives the Party of Socialists a head start in almost all districts as a result of the party’s consolidated grip over the left-leaning pro-Russian electorate.

Moldova’s Action and Solidarity Party, of which I am president, as well as all of the other major opposition parties have strongly opposed these changes to the electoral system. Civil society has also vocally condemned the Plahotniuc-Dodon electoral reform. The Venice Commission criticised the proposal as inappropriate for Moldova. Nonetheless, after months of media manipulation and political intimidation, the Plahotniuc-Dodon cartel has enacted the mixed electoral system.

Protests as the last sliver of hope

Plahotniuc’s illegitimate tactics of getting lawmakers to defect and join his party by hook or by crook, coupled with his vast wealth, a private media conglomerate and the entire administrative resources of the Moldovan state, including the justice system, increasingly put him at an unfair advantage over other parties. All of these anti-democratic actions have triggered mass popular protests.

Most recently, on 17 September, thousands of Moldovan citizens came together and voiced their dissent in front of the parliament building in the capital of Chișinău. However, instead of listening to their legitimate grievances, the regime depicted the peaceful and mostly elderly protesters as a security threat to the police force.

My colleagues and I are alarmed that the next parliamentary election in November 2018 will fail to meet democratic standards, particularly when it comes to the 51 single member constituencies. As electoral districts are now being drawn by a government committee, major concerns arise about potential gerrymandering. Voter suppression and reduction of voting power in the diaspora is another cause for concern.

Most worrisome is that the district winner will be decided by a plurality vote in a single round election, which is sure to produce an incredibly unrepresentative outcome as legislators may be elected with as little as 15% of the vote or even less.

What is at stake?

After having captured the Moldovan state and continuously depriving its citizens of their basic human rights and liberties, Plahotniuc has the audacity to portray himself as the promoter of Moldova’s EU integration agenda and, recently, came up with an amendment to the Constitution, which would reconfirm Moldova’s strategic goal of European integration.

This move is yet another empty gesture aimed at maintaining the pretense of Democratic Party’s pro-European image, while also channeling the public debate along geopolitical lines away from pressing social, economic and political issues at home. Yet, it is becoming increasingly apparent, both for Moldovan citizens as well for the more astute observers abroad, that the geopolitical power play between Plahotniuc’s ruling coalition and president Dodon leaves the European Union mostly unimpressed. Through its rhetoric and actions, the party in power is only discrediting the European ideals in Moldova, helping pro-Russian parties strengthen their popular support.

Moldova is nowhere near graduating from the Council of Europe monitoring mechanism in the field of democracy, human rights and rule of law. During his most recent visit to Moldova, Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, questioned the government’s human rights record, citing the recent tragic death of Andrei Braguța, a man with mental disabilities, in police custody as evidence of major systemic failures in the justice system.

We share the Commissioner’s concern about the lack of public trust in the judiciary being extremely damaging to a democracy. We are also extremely worried about the growing number of cases of politically motivated harassment and intimidation of our fellow party members and supporters in the regions. Law abiding citizens (school teachers and managers, doctors and librarians etc.) are being persecuted for their political views and their civic initiative of joining and supporting the Action and Solidarity Party. We are determined to report all of the government’s abuses in this regards to our international partners.

In light of the above, last week’s decision by the European Union to cut the budget support programme for justice reforms in Moldova and, particularly, the suspension of macro-financial assistance is an indication of the government’s lack of real commitment to EU values. But it also serves as a test case for EU’s political conditionality. It vividly highlights to even more Moldovan citizens that the government controlled by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc does not represent the “steady path to Europe” he wants everyone to believe it does.

As a leader of a genuinely democratic, pro-European political party based on integrity, I plead with Moldova’s friends and partners in the international community not to give up on democracy in my country. Too many Moldovans still hold great hope and are willing to stand up for their country and its democratic future.

Moldova protests

Note: This is an open editorial by Action and Solidarity Party Chairwoman Maia Sandu. It was first published on OpenDemocracy.net and the original can be accessed here.