Category Archives: Moldova

Să facem Moldovenii mândri de țara lor!

Cum ne dorim noi sa arate Moldova peste cinci ani? O țară cu o politică externă consecventă, care a recăpătat încrederea partenerilor externi, care se mișcă cu pași rapizi spre marea familie europeană. O țară care vorbește cu o singură voce, dar care reprezintă majoritatea largă a cetățenilor. O țară care își cunoaște și își promovează ferm interesul național  – o Moldovă a unității!

Astăzi, din păcate, un domeniu de importanță strategică, cum e politica externă și de securitate a Republicii Moldova, a devenit un instrument de dezbinare a societății. „Dezbină și stăpânește” este logica mioapă a celor de la putere, pentru ca noi să nu le cerem socoteală pentru salarii și pensii sub limita sărăciei, pentru hoții și abuzuri necontenite, pentru irosirea încrederii partenerilor externi și pentru nimicirea oricărei speranțe în sufletul oamenilor, forțându-i sa ia calea pribegiei.

 Cetățenii noștri nu de asta au nevoie. Cetățenii doresc un trai mai bun într-o țară care își respectă vecinii și partenerii strategici, o țară care e în stare să le apere drepturile și să le reprezinte interesele în afară. PAS oferă o astfel de oportunitate prin asumarea unei politici externe chibzuite, în care interesele cetățenilor să fie puse în capul mesei.

În lipsa oricărei legitimități în fața propriilor cetățeni și în goana disperată pentru a atrage atenția internațională, guvernarea PD-PSRM lansează atacuri politice furibunde în adresa actorilor geopolitici regionali, fie că e vorba de Romania sau Rusia. // Tandemul de la guvernare a împarțit rolurile, atacând cinic ba Bucureștiul, ba Moscova, sub paravanul unui patriotism de fațadă.

E timpul să schimbăm această stare de lucruri. E timpul ca țara noastră să aibă o politică externă care întrunește aspirațiile acestui popor. E timpul ca Moldova să aibă o singură voce în afară, cea a cetățenilor săi.

Stimați colegi, împreună putem dezvolta o politică externă bazată pe coeziune civică și conștientizarea faptului că suntem parte a unui efort național comun. Acest efort are menirea să contribuie decisiv la creșterea nivelului de trai, fortificarea capacităților de apărare și ancorarea Moldovei în spațiul valorilor democratice. În pofida scepticismului unora, doar integrarea în marea familie europeană poate asigura Moldovei bunăstare, pace și siguranță în ziua de mâine.

Deși cu toții ne dorim căi mai ușoare, nu trebuie să ne lăsăm ademeniți de piste iluzorii, oricât de bine intenționate ar părea. În această lume globalizată și hiper-competitivă Moldova nu poate pluti în derivă, căci va cădea pradă ușoară intemperiilor economice sau geopolitice regionale și globale. Marea familie Euro-Altantică este un refugiu sigur pentru un stat mic, dar care trebuie să aibă aspirații mari.

Suntem și vom ramâne promotorii autentici și credibili ai integrării Europene și a parteneriatului strategic cu România – principalul nostru aliat în procesul de integrare Europeană. Contăm pe relația de colaborare și bună vecinătate cu Ucraina. Dorim să dezvoltăm un parteneriat privilegiat cu Statele Unite ale Americii – unul dintre cei mai mari parteneri de dezvoltare ai Republicii Moldova. În contextul soluționării diferendului transnistrean și valorificării oportunităților comerciale, Federația Rusă rămâne un stat de interes prioritar pentru Moldova, dar care trebuie să se conformeze ireversibilității procesului de integrare Europeană a țării noastre.

De aceea ne pronunțăm pentru valorificarea la maximum a potențialului oferit prin Acordul de Asociere cu Uniunea Europeană, Zona de Liber Schimb Complex şi Cuprinzător și regimul liberalizat de vize. Condamnăm derapajele anti-democratice ale guvernării care prejudiciază procesul de apropiere a Moldovei de Uniunea Europeană.  Mizăm pe aprofundarea cooperării în cadrul platformelor regionale precum Parteneriarul Estic, GUAM și Parteneriatul pentru Pace al Organizației Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord.

Pînă la finele acestui an intenționăm să aderăm la cel mai mare și mai influent partid din Europa – Partidul Popular European. Aceasta este dovada adeziunii noastre față de valorile europene și recunoașterea  deteminării noastre de a aduce Moldova în marea familie Europeană. Acest demers ne va permite să valorificăm mult mai bine potențialul enorm de susținere oferit de partenerii noștri din toate colțurile Europei.

Dragi prieteni, PAS va asigura o politică externă echilibrată și profesionistă bazată pe ireversibilitatea vectorului European. Prin muncă asiduă atât pe plan extern, cât și aici, acasă, putem demonstra că politica, dar și diplomația, pot fi făcute în mod onest, corect și în interesul cetățenilor. Parafrazându-l pe marele Nicolae Titulescu – Politica externă a unei ţări se face prin apărarea fermă şi demnă a interesului  naţional, dar nu prin declarații și iscălituri sterile care pot să vrăjească azi, dar să ne orbească mâine.

Vă îndemn să punem împreună umărul, astfel încât prin acțiune fermă și solidaritate sinceră să facem Moldovenii mîndri de țara lor!

 

Note: This is a speech I gave at the Action and Solidarity Party Congress on September 10, 2017, in Chisinau, Moldova. The video is available on my Facebook page.

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Change of Electoral Systems in EaP Countries: Bolstering Dictators or Causing Maidan

Armenia:

Before the Constitutional Referendum of 2015, Armenia was a semi-presidential republic. It had a semi-proportional representation underpinned by a majority bonus system. The unicameral parliament – National Assembly consisted of 131 deputies, of which 90 were elected on a proportional system and 41 on a majority bonus system, which rewards the largest party with the aim of ensuring stronger government stability. After the Constitutional reform of 2015, Armenia became a parliamentary republic with proportional representation based on one national and 13 regional multi-member constituencies. Yet, incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan, whose second term ends in 2018, is likely to retain strong influence over the political system by becoming Prime Minister (Ayriyan, 2016). The change of the electoral system and the reduction in the number of legislators from 131 to 101 (but may go over 101) is likely to facilitate Sargsyan’s continued grip on power.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan started off a unitary semi-presidential republic with a very strong executive and a mixed electoral system, whereby 100 members were elected in single seat constituencies and 25 on national party lists. Later, in 2002, a constitutional reform was adopted, putting the prime minister second in line to the presidency instead of the parliament speaker, thus creating the conditions for the transfer of power from then President Heydar Aliyev to his son Ilham Aliyev (Heinrich, 2010). The same reforms abolished the mixed electoral system in favor a majoritiarian one and eliminated the 50% turnout threshold for both presidential and legislative elections. In August 2003, İlham Aliyev became prime minister, only to win the October 2003 presidential elections. Another constitutional reform in 2009 further strengthened the president’s grip on power by allowing the president of Azerbaijan to serve for more than two consecutive terms (Gahramonova, 2009). The latest constitutional reform approved in a 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from five to seven years and introduced the office of vice president. Shortly after the referendum, President Aliyev appointed his wife Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice-President (BBC, 2017).

Belarus

The bicameral Belarusian National Assembly is composed of the House of Representatives (lower chamber) and the Council of the Republic (higher chamber). The 110 Representatives are elected in single member constituencies, while 64 Council members (represent regional public authorities) are elected indirectly in seven multi-member constituencies, plus another eight Councilors being appointed directly by the president.  However, the parliament is only a rubber stamp institution with the president having a strong veto over the legislative process (Frear, 2014; Gubarevich, 2016). The vast majority of the directly elected legislators in the lower house are loyal to the president, who has considerable influence over the 94 independents from the total of 110 legislators, because the government routinely employs coercion to marginalize and criminalize the opposition’s mobilization efforts (Kulakevich, 2016). The remaining sixteen seats are divided among five political parties, which have very little impact of the political process. President Lukashenko himself is not a member of any party, but rather prefers to run as an independent.

Georgia

Georgia is a semi-presidential republic. Its unicameral parliament of 150 seats is elected through a mixed electoral system (77 seats are decided in one nationwide constituency and closed party lists, while 73 seats a filled in single member districts). The country has had a relatively vibrant democratic experience compared to the three countries discussed above, particularly after the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” led by Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004 and re-elected in 2008. However, as he was approaching the second term limit, Saakashvili decided to maintain power by becoming prime minister. Thus, in 2010 Parliament adopted amendments to the constitution, shifting some powers from the president to the prime minister. However, by the time his second term expired in 2013, Saakashvili’s United National Movement Party had lost the 2012 Parliamentary elections to the opposition Georgian Dream Party. This was the first peaceful democratic transition of power in the country’s history (Lutsevych, 2013; Delcour, 2015). The Georgian Dream Party went on to improve its results in the October 2016 parliamentary elections, receiving 115 of 150 seats. Another four parties hold the remaining 35 seats, which makes Georgian Dream a dominant party. It appears determined to use its constitutional majority to further cement its dominance by changing the electoral system to a proportional one with a 5% threshold and the redistribution of the unallocated seats to the winner, offering the incumbent undue advantage (Gilbreath and Sichinava, 2017). Also, the Constitutional reform proposed in April 2017 would do away with direct presidential elections. Instead, the president would be elected by a college of electors composed of 300 parliamentarians and municipal council members, transforming Georgia into a parliamentary republic. Even if the proposed change of the way the president is elected would not go into effect until 2023, it is, nonetheless, viewed as an attack by the ruling Party on the President Giorgi Margvelashvili, who is independent (Larsen, 2017). In the short term, the reform could lead to consolidation of the ruling party’s positions, but it could also create room for political pluralism in the future.

Moldova

After a failed experience with the soviet majoritarian electoral system used for Moldova’s first democratic elections, following the 1994 Constitution, Moldova became a semi-presidential republic with a proportional electoral system. However, in 2000, following an attempt by then President Petru Lucinschi to gain more powers via referendum, Parliament intervened and amended the Constitution transforming Moldova into a parliamentary republic, with a largely ceremonial president elected by Parliament with 61 of the total 101 votes. However, after two terms of domination by the Party of Communist Party (2001-2009), a government coalition created in 2009 by former opposition parties did not have enough votes to elect a president, which triggered a three year long constitutional crisis with a series of early parliamentary elections, a failed constitutional referendum, only to finally reach the 61 votes in March 2012 to elect a president. To avoid such difficulties in the future, in March 2016, the Constitutional Court issued a rather controversial decision to cancel parts of the Constitutional Reform of year 2000 on a technically, thus reintroducing direct presidential elections. However, as presidential powers were not changed, Moldova remains a parliamentary republic.

The 101 members of the unicameral Parliament are elected for a four year term in one national constituency based on closed party lists. The threshold has oscillated between 4% and the current 6%. The unallocated seats were distributed proportionally during the 2000’s, which gave an advantage to the dominant Party of Communists. After the opposition took power in 2009, the unallocated seats became distributed equally among the parties that passed the threshold, which benefitted the ruling coalition parties. Yet, the successive coalition governments were torn apart by infighting that produced major political scandals, culminating with a billion dollars or 15% of GDP disappearing from three banks on the eve of 2014 parliamentary elections (Rosca, 2015; Socor, 2016), which led to the jailing of a former prime minister and leader of the senior coalition partner – Liberal Democratic Party, and the reformatting of the ruling coalition. This led to the collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party at the hands of it once junior coalition partner – the Democratic Party (Independent, 2017), which welcomed defectors from PLDM and PCRM, thus becoming the main political force in the government, despite public support of only 4% (IRI, 2017). These and other developments brought increasing concerns about government legitimacy and even state capture (Tudoroiu, 2014).

Still, faced with low public support and realizing the diminishing chances of staying in power, in March 2017, the centrist Democratic Party proposed to change the electoral system from a proportional to a majoritarian one, only to settle on a mixed system compromise struck with the largest opposition party – the Socialists, that have managed to replace the Communists on the left wind of the spectrum. If approved, 51 legislators will be elected as before in a single national consistency on closed party lists, while the other 50 winners will be decided in single member districts in one round, which will allow the ruling party to employ its vast administrate and financial resources to gain undue advantage.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s Constitution provides for a unitary republic with a semi-presidential system. The constitution was first amended following the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 by decreasing the powers of the president, but it fell short of moving towards full fledged parliamentarism (Matsuzato, 2005). The rushed change was only aimed at overcoming the political crisis triggered by a contested presidential election, which led to the “Orange Revolution.” However, once Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, the Constitutional Court overturned the 2004 amendments, on technical irregularities, reinstating a strong presidency. This decision was highly controversial (Kramer et. all, 2011), since it cast doubt over the independence of the Court from the influence of the president (Minakov and Stavniichuk, 2016). Moldova appears to have emulated the questionable Ukrainian experience, when its own Constitutional Court, under immense political pressure, invalidated in 2016 a major constitutional reform from the year 2000 that had transformed Moldova into a fully parliamentary republic.

Ukraine has experienced all three main types of electoral systems. Much like all of the former USSR republics, Ukraine started off with the soviet majority (FPSP) system, but due to the double majority rule (50%+1 turnout and 50%+1 votes) many seats were left unoccupied. Discussions about reforming the system started as early as 1993, only to actually move to a mixed electoral system in 1997. The new electoral system undermined the nascent party system by bring 114 independents into Parliament after the 1998 legislative elections (Harasymiw, 2014).   Thus, the mixed system was used for just two electoral cycles (1998, 2002), only to be replaced with a full proportional system used in 2006, 2007 elections (Bader, 2010). Proportional system reduced the effective number of parties and brought some consolidation of the party system. However, as the ruling Party of Regions lost 3 million votes in 2010 local elections, President Victor Yanunovych, hoping to be able to use administrative resources to manipulate results in single member districts, proposed to returned to a mixed electoral system in 2012, under which half of the representatives are elected in one national constituency based on closed party lists, with a 5% threshold, while the other half are elected in single member districts (Harasymiw, 2014). Even though, there have not been major shifts in the effective number of parties, the third electoral system change in less than fifteen years appears to have reduced the turnout by about 8% compared to previous elections, which can be an indication of public frustration and loss of trust in the democratic process. System volatility also increased as two new parties gained over a quarter of the votes.

Not surprisingly, the ruling Party of Regions gained over half of seats in single member districts, while other parties were significantly underrepresented when compared to their results in the proportional list vote. It can be concluded that the Party of Regions archived its goal. Yet, one can only speculate what could have happened in a counterfactual scenario in which the fully proportional system would have remained in place. Perhaps, the Party of Regions would have lost the 2012 elections and Ukraine could have, therefore, avoided the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution, the loss of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbas. One thing is certain, the country’s political elite is still guided by short term political expediency, rather than genuine debate on a long term constitutional design as was epitomized by the bill to introduce open electoral lists, which failed without proper consideration in 2014 (Interfax, 2014).

Maidan-Square-Feb-2014-photo-by-Olga-Yakimovich-Reuters