Tag Archives: electoral reform

Don’t give up on democracy in Moldova

My country was once a leader in democratic transition in the post-Soviet space. It had high hopes of joining the European family of nations as the poster child of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership programme. This has proven to be an illusion. Despite struggling with corruption and poor governance, political pluralism and independent media are a cherished achievement of Moldova’s young and feeble democracy. But even these achievements are coming to an end.

Moldova is now a captured state that needs to be returned to its citizens. One politician, whose party received less than 16% of the vote in the 2014 parliamentary election, now has the dubious honor of running the entire country. Despite holding no public office, oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc is now the kingpin of Moldova. He has managed to take over all of the key state institutions, including parliament, the government and the judiciary, by all the means at his disposal.

Plahotniuc’s ownership of the largest media holding in the country, coupled with his control over the nominally independent national public broadcaster, allows for his vast political influence to go completely unchecked.

Changing the rules of the game

The recent adoption of the highly controversial electoral reform and attempts to restrict the independence of civil nongovernmental organizations serve as vivid examples of Moldova’s democratic backsliding.

By changing the electoral system, Democratic Party leader Vlad Plahotniuc and pro-Russian president Igor Dodon, elected with Plahotniuc’s support, have established a de facto political cartel in order to marginalise the remaining opposition parties from political competition, even if Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party polled at just four percent in the survey conducted by the International Republic Institute last spring. The new electoral system is clearly designed to benefit the incumbent Democratic Party, which can rely on its vast resources to gain undue advantage, but it also gives the Party of Socialists a head start in almost all districts as a result of the party’s consolidated grip over the left-leaning pro-Russian electorate.

Moldova’s Action and Solidarity Party, of which I am president, as well as all of the other major opposition parties have strongly opposed these changes to the electoral system. Civil society has also vocally condemned the Plahotniuc-Dodon electoral reform. The Venice Commission criticised the proposal as inappropriate for Moldova. Nonetheless, after months of media manipulation and political intimidation, the Plahotniuc-Dodon cartel has enacted the mixed electoral system.

Protests as the last sliver of hope

Plahotniuc’s illegitimate tactics of getting lawmakers to defect and join his party by hook or by crook, coupled with his vast wealth, a private media conglomerate and the entire administrative resources of the Moldovan state, including the justice system, increasingly put him at an unfair advantage over other parties. All of these anti-democratic actions have triggered mass popular protests.

Most recently, on 17 September, thousands of Moldovan citizens came together and voiced their dissent in front of the parliament building in the capital of Chișinău. However, instead of listening to their legitimate grievances, the regime depicted the peaceful and mostly elderly protesters as a security threat to the police force.

My colleagues and I are alarmed that the next parliamentary election in November 2018 will fail to meet democratic standards, particularly when it comes to the 51 single member constituencies. As electoral districts are now being drawn by a government committee, major concerns arise about potential gerrymandering. Voter suppression and reduction of voting power in the diaspora is another cause for concern.

Most worrisome is that the district winner will be decided by a plurality vote in a single round election, which is sure to produce an incredibly unrepresentative outcome as legislators may be elected with as little as 15% of the vote or even less.

What is at stake?

After having captured the Moldovan state and continuously depriving its citizens of their basic human rights and liberties, Plahotniuc has the audacity to portray himself as the promoter of Moldova’s EU integration agenda and, recently, came up with an amendment to the Constitution, which would reconfirm Moldova’s strategic goal of European integration.

This move is yet another empty gesture aimed at maintaining the pretense of Democratic Party’s pro-European image, while also channeling the public debate along geopolitical lines away from pressing social, economic and political issues at home. Yet, it is becoming increasingly apparent, both for Moldovan citizens as well for the more astute observers abroad, that the geopolitical power play between Plahotniuc’s ruling coalition and president Dodon leaves the European Union mostly unimpressed. Through its rhetoric and actions, the party in power is only discrediting the European ideals in Moldova, helping pro-Russian parties strengthen their popular support.

Moldova is nowhere near graduating from the Council of Europe monitoring mechanism in the field of democracy, human rights and rule of law. During his most recent visit to Moldova, Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, questioned the government’s human rights record, citing the recent tragic death of Andrei Braguța, a man with mental disabilities, in police custody as evidence of major systemic failures in the justice system.

We share the Commissioner’s concern about the lack of public trust in the judiciary being extremely damaging to a democracy. We are also extremely worried about the growing number of cases of politically motivated harassment and intimidation of our fellow party members and supporters in the regions. Law abiding citizens (school teachers and managers, doctors and librarians etc.) are being persecuted for their political views and their civic initiative of joining and supporting the Action and Solidarity Party. We are determined to report all of the government’s abuses in this regards to our international partners.

In light of the above, last week’s decision by the European Union to cut the budget support programme for justice reforms in Moldova and, particularly, the suspension of macro-financial assistance is an indication of the government’s lack of real commitment to EU values. But it also serves as a test case for EU’s political conditionality. It vividly highlights to even more Moldovan citizens that the government controlled by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc does not represent the “steady path to Europe” he wants everyone to believe it does.

As a leader of a genuinely democratic, pro-European political party based on integrity, I plead with Moldova’s friends and partners in the international community not to give up on democracy in my country. Too many Moldovans still hold great hope and are willing to stand up for their country and its democratic future.

Moldova protests

Note: This is an open editorial by Action and Solidarity Party Chairwoman Maia Sandu. It was first published on OpenDemocracy.net and the original can be accessed here.

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Change of Electoral Systems in EaP Countries: Bolstering Dictators or Causing Maidan

Armenia:

Before the Constitutional Referendum of 2015, Armenia was a semi-presidential republic. It had a semi-proportional representation underpinned by a majority bonus system. The unicameral parliament – National Assembly consisted of 131 deputies, of which 90 were elected on a proportional system and 41 on a majority bonus system, which rewards the largest party with the aim of ensuring stronger government stability. After the Constitutional reform of 2015, Armenia became a parliamentary republic with proportional representation based on one national and 13 regional multi-member constituencies. Yet, incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan, whose second term ends in 2018, is likely to retain strong influence over the political system by becoming Prime Minister (Ayriyan, 2016). The change of the electoral system and the reduction in the number of legislators from 131 to 101 (but may go over 101) is likely to facilitate Sargsyan’s continued grip on power.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan started off a unitary semi-presidential republic with a very strong executive and a mixed electoral system, whereby 100 members were elected in single seat constituencies and 25 on national party lists. Later, in 2002, a constitutional reform was adopted, putting the prime minister second in line to the presidency instead of the parliament speaker, thus creating the conditions for the transfer of power from then President Heydar Aliyev to his son Ilham Aliyev (Heinrich, 2010). The same reforms abolished the mixed electoral system in favor a majoritiarian one and eliminated the 50% turnout threshold for both presidential and legislative elections. In August 2003, İlham Aliyev became prime minister, only to win the October 2003 presidential elections. Another constitutional reform in 2009 further strengthened the president’s grip on power by allowing the president of Azerbaijan to serve for more than two consecutive terms (Gahramonova, 2009). The latest constitutional reform approved in a 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from five to seven years and introduced the office of vice president. Shortly after the referendum, President Aliyev appointed his wife Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice-President (BBC, 2017).

Belarus

The bicameral Belarusian National Assembly is composed of the House of Representatives (lower chamber) and the Council of the Republic (higher chamber). The 110 Representatives are elected in single member constituencies, while 64 Council members (represent regional public authorities) are elected indirectly in seven multi-member constituencies, plus another eight Councilors being appointed directly by the president.  However, the parliament is only a rubber stamp institution with the president having a strong veto over the legislative process (Frear, 2014; Gubarevich, 2016). The vast majority of the directly elected legislators in the lower house are loyal to the president, who has considerable influence over the 94 independents from the total of 110 legislators, because the government routinely employs coercion to marginalize and criminalize the opposition’s mobilization efforts (Kulakevich, 2016). The remaining sixteen seats are divided among five political parties, which have very little impact of the political process. President Lukashenko himself is not a member of any party, but rather prefers to run as an independent.

Georgia

Georgia is a semi-presidential republic. Its unicameral parliament of 150 seats is elected through a mixed electoral system (77 seats are decided in one nationwide constituency and closed party lists, while 73 seats a filled in single member districts). The country has had a relatively vibrant democratic experience compared to the three countries discussed above, particularly after the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” led by Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004 and re-elected in 2008. However, as he was approaching the second term limit, Saakashvili decided to maintain power by becoming prime minister. Thus, in 2010 Parliament adopted amendments to the constitution, shifting some powers from the president to the prime minister. However, by the time his second term expired in 2013, Saakashvili’s United National Movement Party had lost the 2012 Parliamentary elections to the opposition Georgian Dream Party. This was the first peaceful democratic transition of power in the country’s history (Lutsevych, 2013; Delcour, 2015). The Georgian Dream Party went on to improve its results in the October 2016 parliamentary elections, receiving 115 of 150 seats. Another four parties hold the remaining 35 seats, which makes Georgian Dream a dominant party. It appears determined to use its constitutional majority to further cement its dominance by changing the electoral system to a proportional one with a 5% threshold and the redistribution of the unallocated seats to the winner, offering the incumbent undue advantage (Gilbreath and Sichinava, 2017). Also, the Constitutional reform proposed in April 2017 would do away with direct presidential elections. Instead, the president would be elected by a college of electors composed of 300 parliamentarians and municipal council members, transforming Georgia into a parliamentary republic. Even if the proposed change of the way the president is elected would not go into effect until 2023, it is, nonetheless, viewed as an attack by the ruling Party on the President Giorgi Margvelashvili, who is independent (Larsen, 2017). In the short term, the reform could lead to consolidation of the ruling party’s positions, but it could also create room for political pluralism in the future.

Moldova

After a failed experience with the soviet majoritarian electoral system used for Moldova’s first democratic elections, following the 1994 Constitution, Moldova became a semi-presidential republic with a proportional electoral system. However, in 2000, following an attempt by then President Petru Lucinschi to gain more powers via referendum, Parliament intervened and amended the Constitution transforming Moldova into a parliamentary republic, with a largely ceremonial president elected by Parliament with 61 of the total 101 votes. However, after two terms of domination by the Party of Communist Party (2001-2009), a government coalition created in 2009 by former opposition parties did not have enough votes to elect a president, which triggered a three year long constitutional crisis with a series of early parliamentary elections, a failed constitutional referendum, only to finally reach the 61 votes in March 2012 to elect a president. To avoid such difficulties in the future, in March 2016, the Constitutional Court issued a rather controversial decision to cancel parts of the Constitutional Reform of year 2000 on a technically, thus reintroducing direct presidential elections. However, as presidential powers were not changed, Moldova remains a parliamentary republic.

The 101 members of the unicameral Parliament are elected for a four year term in one national constituency based on closed party lists. The threshold has oscillated between 4% and the current 6%. The unallocated seats were distributed proportionally during the 2000’s, which gave an advantage to the dominant Party of Communists. After the opposition took power in 2009, the unallocated seats became distributed equally among the parties that passed the threshold, which benefitted the ruling coalition parties. Yet, the successive coalition governments were torn apart by infighting that produced major political scandals, culminating with a billion dollars or 15% of GDP disappearing from three banks on the eve of 2014 parliamentary elections (Rosca, 2015; Socor, 2016), which led to the jailing of a former prime minister and leader of the senior coalition partner – Liberal Democratic Party, and the reformatting of the ruling coalition. This led to the collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party at the hands of it once junior coalition partner – the Democratic Party (Independent, 2017), which welcomed defectors from PLDM and PCRM, thus becoming the main political force in the government, despite public support of only 4% (IRI, 2017). These and other developments brought increasing concerns about government legitimacy and even state capture (Tudoroiu, 2014).

Still, faced with low public support and realizing the diminishing chances of staying in power, in March 2017, the centrist Democratic Party proposed to change the electoral system from a proportional to a majoritarian one, only to settle on a mixed system compromise struck with the largest opposition party – the Socialists, that have managed to replace the Communists on the left wind of the spectrum. If approved, 51 legislators will be elected as before in a single national consistency on closed party lists, while the other 50 winners will be decided in single member districts in one round, which will allow the ruling party to employ its vast administrate and financial resources to gain undue advantage.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s Constitution provides for a unitary republic with a semi-presidential system. The constitution was first amended following the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 by decreasing the powers of the president, but it fell short of moving towards full fledged parliamentarism (Matsuzato, 2005). The rushed change was only aimed at overcoming the political crisis triggered by a contested presidential election, which led to the “Orange Revolution.” However, once Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, the Constitutional Court overturned the 2004 amendments, on technical irregularities, reinstating a strong presidency. This decision was highly controversial (Kramer et. all, 2011), since it cast doubt over the independence of the Court from the influence of the president (Minakov and Stavniichuk, 2016). Moldova appears to have emulated the questionable Ukrainian experience, when its own Constitutional Court, under immense political pressure, invalidated in 2016 a major constitutional reform from the year 2000 that had transformed Moldova into a fully parliamentary republic.

Ukraine has experienced all three main types of electoral systems. Much like all of the former USSR republics, Ukraine started off with the soviet majority (FPSP) system, but due to the double majority rule (50%+1 turnout and 50%+1 votes) many seats were left unoccupied. Discussions about reforming the system started as early as 1993, only to actually move to a mixed electoral system in 1997. The new electoral system undermined the nascent party system by bring 114 independents into Parliament after the 1998 legislative elections (Harasymiw, 2014).   Thus, the mixed system was used for just two electoral cycles (1998, 2002), only to be replaced with a full proportional system used in 2006, 2007 elections (Bader, 2010). Proportional system reduced the effective number of parties and brought some consolidation of the party system. However, as the ruling Party of Regions lost 3 million votes in 2010 local elections, President Victor Yanunovych, hoping to be able to use administrative resources to manipulate results in single member districts, proposed to returned to a mixed electoral system in 2012, under which half of the representatives are elected in one national constituency based on closed party lists, with a 5% threshold, while the other half are elected in single member districts (Harasymiw, 2014). Even though, there have not been major shifts in the effective number of parties, the third electoral system change in less than fifteen years appears to have reduced the turnout by about 8% compared to previous elections, which can be an indication of public frustration and loss of trust in the democratic process. System volatility also increased as two new parties gained over a quarter of the votes.

Not surprisingly, the ruling Party of Regions gained over half of seats in single member districts, while other parties were significantly underrepresented when compared to their results in the proportional list vote. It can be concluded that the Party of Regions archived its goal. Yet, one can only speculate what could have happened in a counterfactual scenario in which the fully proportional system would have remained in place. Perhaps, the Party of Regions would have lost the 2012 elections and Ukraine could have, therefore, avoided the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution, the loss of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbas. One thing is certain, the country’s political elite is still guided by short term political expediency, rather than genuine debate on a long term constitutional design as was epitomized by the bill to introduce open electoral lists, which failed without proper consideration in 2014 (Interfax, 2014).

Maidan-Square-Feb-2014-photo-by-Olga-Yakimovich-Reuters