Tag Archives: EU integration

How international media failed Moldova’s protesters

Moldova’s image as the poorest country in Europe is rivaled only by its obscurity. In rare outbursts of international media coverage — often related to human trafficking, arms smuggling or mass protests — Moldova is depicted as a pawn on the regional chessboard, caught in a tug of war between Russia and the west. There is no denying that, in a world of realpolitik, Moldova is indeed a playground.

Yet there is more to this intellectual inertia than meets the eye. The sheer lack of nuance and insight displayed by the international media with regards to the latest developments in Moldova is as disappointing as it is predictable. 
Much in the way of confirmation bias is at work here — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. People are usually unwilling and, at times, admittedly unable to comprehend complex phenomena, especially when simple mental shortcuts are readily available.

Professional journalists and political analysts pride themselves on preventing or minimising the influence of such biases on their work. This is easier said than done, particularly in today’s world of ubiquitous geopolitical expediency. Moldova is a case in point.

Perils of European integration

Since the so-called ‘Twitter Revolution’ of 2009, Moldova has embarked on a path of economic transformation and political democratisation — or so everyone thought. The post-revolutionary government took on a rather inspirational name, the Alliance for European Integration, which proved to be both a blessing and a curse.

Generous western financial assistance and political support locked the United States and European Union into the costly self-fulfilling prophecy of a ‘success story’. But the success failed to materialise, despite promising beginnings. Five pro-European governments succeeded each other faster than the public could keep up with, and they spared no effort in building an elaborate discourse of European integration both at home and abroad. One could not help but be mesmerised by the audacity of Moldova’s leadership that promised to bring the country into the EU by 2020.

Over 100,000 protesters took to the streets of Moldova’s capital in September 2015 to protest the ‘stolen billion’. Photo courtesy of Maria Levcencova

Naturally, high hopes developed among more gullible Moldovans and international development partners alike. But the signs of trouble appeared early on.

As early as 2011, there have been hostile takeovers of privately held shares in several leading banks, known as the raider attacks. Then came the infamous ‘Huntigate’ scandal of 2013 — a cover-up of a fatal accident during a lavish hunting spree attended by the top brass of the country’s judiciary, including the Prosecutor General. Finally, ‘the billion dollar bank heist’ left the country perplexed as to how one could steal the equivalent of 15 percent of GDP from three banks with impunity.

Once a poster child of Moldova’s European Integration, Vlad Filat, former prime minister and Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, ended up a scapegoat for the missing billion. Meanwhile, Filat’s archenemy the oligarch and senior vice president of the Democratic Party, Vlad Plahotniuc, became the sole decision maker in the country.

By hook or by crook, Plahotniuc was able to create a majority coalition (which oddly bears no name). It was rushed to a vote in parliament as protesters gathered outside and soon started demanding early elections. This clearly begs the question: how can international media refer to the current reincarnation of previous governments as pro-European?

Monstrous coalition

Reports from Euronews, BBC, New York Times as well as Russia Today all described the new government as ‘pro-European’ — much to the bewilderment of Moldovan civil society. In a very heartfelt piece on his personal page, Dumitru Alaiba, a former economic and financial advisor to two prime ministers, urged international media and western politicians: “Do what you must, just don’t call this government ‘pro-European’. It is not Europe that they represent. And don’t call us, the people, pro-Russian either.”

Well-respected media institutions used a default template for covering Moldova, relying mainly on the fact that the new government presented itself as pro-European. A more astute analysis would indicate that the new government is ‘pro-European’ in name only.

After numerous Moldovan activists wrote public letters calling upon western media to take a more mindful view of the ongoing protests, a change of toneoccurred. There is now a broad acknowledgement that protesters were, and are, a distinctly heterogeneous group. Admittedly, many of them are pro-Russian, yet a lot are as pro-European as they come. What unites them all is a genuine frustration with an ad-hoc “monstrous coalition” government and a desire for a more democratic and prosperous future.

This is largely missing from the international media discourse, caught in the cross fire between Russia and the west. Russia has capitalised on the growing anti-European sentiment in Moldova, and by supporting these ruling elites, western media and western politicians have only vindicated Kremlin’s propaganda.

Another piece of the puzzle

Russia’s postimperial syndrome is built on the belief that the west is containing its resurgence by creating a belt of instability in south-east Europe — a mantra that rarely departs from Russian TV screens. Moldova is seen as just another piece of the puzzle. Moscow has a clear agenda of trying to bring Moldova back into its orbit and does not shy away from making its intentions known either.

For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 parliamentary elections, Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Russian presidential administration, attempted to broker a coalition deal between the Communists and the Democrats. In the 2014 campaign, Russia openly supported the Socialist Party.

The complexity of the Moldovan political landscape cannot be reduced to a mere east-west dichotomy

Russian media, which still holds a lot of sway over Moldovan public opinion, has been an indispensable tool in this process. Interestingly though, the rebroadcasting rights in Moldova for the most popular Russian federal TV channels are owned by so called ‘pro-European’ politicians, primarily Vlad Plahotniuc. He owns, among a few others, the Moldovan license for Russia’s flagship Channel One. Russian media coverage of protests in Moldova paints the EU in a negative tone, while reinforcing the message of Eurasian Economic Union as a better alternative. The aim of these reports may be as much to appeal Russia’s domestic audience as it is to influence public perceptions in Moldova.

This sort of nuance is helpful in understanding the complexity of the Moldovan political landscape, which cannot be reduced to a mere east-west dichotomy.

The same is true for the protest movement. Many things that politicians had kept to themselves, such as allegations of blackmail and corruption, came to light only after mass protests erupted. However, for a long time, protesters could not set their differences aside in order to pursue a common goal: early elections.

Even when they finally did, the much heralded unity of protesters across ethnic, linguistic, ideological and party lines proved too good to be true. The nascent movement is constantly being undermined by infighting.

Besides, there have always been doubts about the independence of such political players as the socialist leader Igor Dodon, Our Party head Renato Usatii, and front man of the civic platform turned political party, Andrei Năstase. Hence, the real tragedy is that genuine popular protests are led by less than candid individuals.

Bridging the divide

Instead of helping to bridge this divide, both media and politicians have contributed to the increased polarisation of public opinion by presenting just one side of the debate, reinforcing the ever-present confirmation bias.

This development is particularly visible when it comes to Romanian or Russian news reports, as well as political commentary on developments in Moldova. Self-proclaimed leader of the Moldovan diaspora in Russia, Aleksandr Kalinin, posted a Facebook video calling upon Vladimir Putin to come and rescue the Moldovans from what he saw as an imminent takeover by Romanian and Ukrainian special forces.

Protest march in the Moldovan capital Chisinau, January 2016. Photo (c): visual RIAN. All rights reserved.

The response came in a leading Romanian newspaper from none other than a prominent Romanian analyst and former adviser to Romanian president Traian Băsescu, Iulian Chifu, who called the video an “official request” to Putin. To his credit, Chifu went on to debunk Kalinin’s bogus allegations, but the latter was afforded much more attention than he deserved even in the aftermath of Crimea and Donbas.

The EU’s former enlargement commissioner Štefan Füle is perfectly right whenhe says that: “We should be more active in addressing [pro-Russian] propaganda about what the Eurasian Economic Union offers versus what the EU offers a country like Moldova.” Undeniably, Russian media will continue to produce characteristically biased reports about Moldova, but if western media want to have any claim to a higher moral ground they have to give up using simple shortcuts and produce accurate accounts no matter how tedious or inconvenient that may be.

Max Seddon’s recent article in the Financial Times, for example, does just that. He reports that “In private, some European diplomats say they would welcome a pro-Russian government — if only so that the current coalition cannot further tarnish the EU. Says one: ‘Asking them to do reforms is like asking turkeys to prepare Christmas dinner.’”

Who are the pro-Europeans now?

No matter how ironic it may sound, a pro-Russian government is likely to be the only thing that can rehabilitate the European Union’s image in Moldova. The risks of a new government changing Moldova’s foreign policy course are minimal: it would be economically irrational and politically suicidal, since most of the burden of adjusting to the new EU-Moldova Association Agreement has been incurred, while the benefits are only kicking in.

The new government cannot be called pro-European and, to its credit, it does not use the term. The coalition that Plahotniuc has put together literally has no name nor a coalition agreement. It relies on the program of the previous government despite being a “coalition of the willing”. Namely, the will of the 57 lawmakers being to preclude early elections and stay in power for another three years despite the sheer collapse of public trust after the infamous bank heist and the utter refusal to accept any blame either by the government or the parliament.

Moldova is a case study for state capture, though perhaps had Moldova been an EU candidate country, things would have been different via conditionality. The West has sacrificed democracy for geopolitical interests, which is usually a recipe for disaster down the road.

The sole threat of an imminent pro-Russian government is likely to galvanise and reboot the political system, albeit incrementally, with a new breed of upstanding young professionals exiting their comfort zones and entering the public domain to the benefit of their communities and their country — the alternative being a drift away from the values of democracy and the rule of law, all under the watchful eye of the international media.

Note: The original article was written for OpenDemocracy.net and can be accessed here.


Moldova Cannot Own its Future unless it Breaks with its Past

Whenever Moldova features in international media, it is often referred to in superlatives.  However, many of those are rather negative:  poorest, most corrupt, least developed country in Europe. Apart from historical and geographical factors, a long series of policy failures have led to a state of despair that leaves the older generation nostalgic about the soviet past and demoralizes the youth into fleeing their country in search of a more dignifying existence.  This is the Moldovan story of the last two decades.  In stark contrast to the V4 counsoviet-union-passport-13559973tries, Moldova has been notoriously ambiguous about its direction of development, oscillating between East and West. It is only now that Moldova has seemingly committed itself to reuniting with Europe, despite hardly ever being part of Europe, other than in a geographical sense.

Nonetheless, after the fall of communism, Moldovans have embraced Europe much faster than did the county’s elite, who were by en large a product of the old regime.  Unchained, Moldovans began migrating to the west, mainly to escape the abject poverty that resulted from the mishandling of independence.  Frustration continues to grow exponentially as Moldovans witness the disconnect between advancements in neighboring EU countries and lack of meaningful change back home.  All sorts of inferiority complexes arise reinforced by generous Russian media innuendo about Moldovans becoming second class citizens in the EU. It is, therefore, crucial that Moldova learns from the V4 experience, even if precious time was lost.


For a number of reasons, V4 countries have been considerably more successful in putting their sovereignty to good use. Aided by their history, geography, and economy, coupled with resolute policy action in the early 90’s, V4 countries, on the one hand, have surged ahead with little nostalgia about the past. Moldovans, on the other hand, have constantly looked back and second guessed their every step. No wonder national politics are still dominated by figures that revere the past and are apprehensive about the future. Moldova failed to escape the grip of history largely due to the fact that Russia has been instrumental in both orchestrating and exploiting that failure. Upcoming parliamentarEU passporty elections appear to be a case in point.  Unlike in V4 countries, Russian media has an overwhelming influence over the minds of average Moldovan voters. Besides, Moldovan exports of agricultural produce and labor to Russia represent powerful leverage against Chisinau leadership, not to mention gas supply and the use of separatist elements as well as highly vocal Russian speaking minorities in Moldova. All this makes V4 experience so difficult to compare and transplant into Moldovan realities. Yet, it makes it all the more valuable.

Moldova’s chances of success depend heavily on its inner capacity to overcome the misfortunes of historic and geographic determinism. Yet, more importantly, it can only embark on a sustainable path of development once it firmly decides on its strategic goals, unites the society behind those goals and sticks to them. It may seem that the second is the most difficult, yet, I would argue that carrying on unswervingly is the most challenging part. If we assume that EU integration is the goal backed by the majority, albeit a modest one, then implementing this goal is, no doubt, the most demanding task. Not only is it objectively difficult, given painstaking reforms required to accede to the European family of nations, it may also backfire simply because the agents of change lack the moral legitimacy to carry out that task as long as they are entangled in corruption, controlling the judiciary, stripping the country of valuable public assets, all under the banner of EU integration.  As long as Moldovan leaders perceive their electoral wins as a mandate to do as they please, in blatant disregard of European norms and values, people will question the European path not so much in terms of the goal, but as a process.

Politicians who fail to practice what they preach are not endemic to Moldova, in fact, V4 countries abound in reckless government actions, just look at modern day Hungary, but they have a vibrant civil society to hold them accountable. Similarly, free, if not always independent, media is a much better watchdog in V4 countries than in Moldova. Finally, there is less poverty and, thus, a stronger middle class that does not live by bread alone. Therefore, efforts from V4 countries in boosting Moldova’s economy, civil society, media freedom, rule of law and legal empowerment are all welcomed. I am confident that the only way forward for Moldova and its people is building a culture of respect for the law and each other. V4 countries can lend us a friendly hand, but it is the Moldovans who have to do the heavy lifting and, once and for all, stop looking back.

Note: This essay was written for  a project on European Integration and Reform Experience of the Visegrad countries and how it relates to Moldova’s European path. The essay was also published on MESA10 website.