Tag Archives: Iurie Leanca

Deconstructing Vlad Plahotniuc’s article in the Wall Street Journal

An article published in the WSJ opinion section on 27 December, 2017, signed by the head of Moldova’s ruling Democratic Party Vlad Plahotniuc proclaimed that Moldova needs the West’s help against an aggressive Russia, but a closer scrutiny of Plahotniuc’s record reveals that his anti-Russian rhetoric is nothing more than a political strategy aimed at gaining domestic legitimacy and foreign support for his increasingly anti-democratic regime. This becomes all the more clear once we put Mr. P’s WSJ statements into actual context.

Mr. P: “Moldova is dependent on Russian energy. We are seeking to diversify and hope to integrate with the European gas and electricity markets via Romania by end of next year.”

–    On 1 April 2017, following an internationally monitored procurement procedure,  Moldova’s state owned Energocom (controlled by Plahotniuc’s government) signed a one-year contract to import electricity from Ukraine. Two months later, Moldovan side (read Plahotniuc)surprised its western partners by deciding to modify the contract in favor of the Russian state owned power plant in the separatist region of Transnistria, which fails to pay for the Russian gas it uses to produce the electricity it sells to Moldova, having accrued an over 6 billion USD debt, officially accumulating on the books of the Moldovan state owned gas company. Thus, Plahotniuc is increasing Moldova’s strategic dependence on Russia, instead of reducing it by acquiring electricity from Ukraine.

–       Moreover, after the Annexation of Crimea and during the War in Donbas, in November 2014 then Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy Andrian Candu, now Parliament Speaker and Plahotniuc’s closest protégé was eager to offer Russian investors concessions or have them privatize strategic Moldovan infrastructure assets such as the energy grid, national railway, state  telecom company, which only proves that, when it comes to making money, the Democratic Party and Plahotniuc totally disregard the Russian threat to Moldova and the region.                      

Mr. P: “Between 2011 and 2014, Russian-backed interest groups manipulated Moldova’s banking system to launder more than $20 billion.”

–          Plahotniuc has held enormous sway over the Moldovan justice system and banking sector. During that timeframe, he controlled a large stake in one of the banks involved in money laundering. He also controlled the prosecutor general. Needless to say, such a large scale laundering operation would not have been possible without his blessing. Similarly, Plahotniuc fails to mention the billion dollars stolen from Moldovan banks under his watch and the failure to prosecute the main fraudster – Ilan Shor, as identified in an independent Western financial forensic investigation.

–          Moreover, it was none other than the current Justice Minister Alexandru Tanase who back in 2010, as a legislator, promoted the amendment that created the necessary conditions for the $20 billion Laundromat by eliminating the 3% state tax in cases of property disputes, replacing it with a ceiling of about 1500 EUR for physical  persons and 3000 EUR for legal persons. Without this crucial amendment, the launderings of $20 billion would have cost 0.6 billion, making it a much less attractive undertaking, even without adding all the presumed bribes offered to the judges and other accomplices in this vast criminal enterprise.       

Mr. P: “Given that a significant percentage of Moldova’s population is exposed to Russian-controlled media, propaganda and the anxiety it stirs are among the biggest threats we face.”

–          Plahotniuc owns the rebroadcasting rights to the first Russian federal TV channel – Perviy Kanal – the most influential Kremlin propaganda tool. Moldova’s Broadcasting Regulator controlled by Plahotniuc offered an associate of pro-Russian president Igor Dodon a license to rebroadcast the second Russian federal channel – the nefarious NTV. For a decade now, Plahotniuc has been making a fortune off Russian TV propaganda in Moldova.

Mr. P: “We need the West to invest in an independent media market.”

–        Plahotniuc’s political and administrative machine has been harassing and obstructing independent media, including those funded by Western donors. The six months delay in issuing TV8 a license is a case in point. It is largely because of Plahotniuc’s actions that Moldova dropped four positions in the Reporters without Borders 2017 Press Freedom Index.        

Mr. P: “Unfortunately, powerful political forces, including our pro-Russia president, Igor Dodon, are sympathetic to Moscow’s narrative.”

–        Plahotniuc’s media empire played a major role in the election of pro-Russian president Igor Dodon. Dodon’s fellow Socialists, in turn, offered Plahotniuc a life vest by supporting the highly controversial introduction of the mixed electoral system that gives Plahotniuc a chance to hold onto power after the next election, as his party risked not passing the 6% threshold under the previous proportional party list system.  

Mr. P: “Moldova is a proud multiethnic state, devoted to reform and democracy.”

–         In the last two years, Moldova has been suffering from clear democratic backsliding, as reflected in the worsening of the country’s Freedom House Democracy Score. Similarly, Moldova has fallen in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. Democratic Party’s ongoing attack on local public administration and intimation on mayors, aimed at forcing them to join the ruling party is particularly damaging to local democracy. After orchestrating a hostile takeover against the democratically elected Chisinau municipal administration, now the second largest city Balti is undergoing a similar scenario.  

 

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Former Transnistrian Separatist Leader Finds Refuge in Moldova Thanks to Plahotniuc.

 

 

 

 

 

           

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New Pro-Western Moldovan Defense Minister Faces Uphill Battle

On October 24, Eugen Sturza was sworn in as Moldova’s minister of defense by Parliament Speaker Andrian Candu. This put an end to an eleven-month-long battle over the appointment between pro-Russian President Igor Dodon and the nominally pro-Western government, controlled by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. After Dodon repeatedly refused to appoint Sturza, citing the nominee’s lack of experience in the defense sector and his questionable integrity, the Constitutional Court had to step in. The Court sided with the government, temporarily relieving the president of his constitutional prerogative of appointing ministers. The ruling is yet another controversial decision by the high Court that undermines the few remaining checks and balances in the Moldovan political system (see EDM, October 24). With his legitimacy being questioned, the new Defense Minister Sturza is likely to face significant challenges in spearheading his new vision for the Moldovan defense sector.

Eugen Sturza, Candu, Filip

Moldova faces a number of major security threats. The frozen conflict with the separatist region of Transnistria and the presence of Russian troops and munitions in the breakaway area pose a continuous threat to Moldova’s sovereignty and national security. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea also carry major risks for Moldova. At the same time, Moldova remains highly vulnerable to “hybrid” (“new type”) threats in terms of energy, informational and cybersecurity. In recent years, there has been increased awareness domestically about the need to boost the country’s defense capabilities; but to date, little has been done. With about 6,500 active-duty military personnel, the Moldovan army remains smaller and considerably undertrained and underequipped compared to the 7,500-strong Moscow-backed Transnistrian force, not including the roughly 1,600 regular Russian troops stationed in the region (Deutsche Welle, April 20, 2015; (Russiancouncil.ru, accessed November 16, 2017; see EDM, July 31).

Despite being consistently rated the second-most-trusted institution in the country, following only the Church (Iri.org, November 8), the Moldovan Armed Forces remain underfunded and the country’s defense budget has been by far the lowest in the region, stagnant at 0.3 percent of GDP. Only since 2015 has there been an actual increase in defense spending (Agora, May 16, 2015; Moldnova.eu, July 15, 2016). Nonetheless, despite incremental growth in absolute terms, relative to GDP the 2017 defense budget was actually slightly lower compared to the year before—0.4 percent versus 0.42 percent of GDP, respectively (Mf.gov.md, 2017, accessed November 16). These figures underscore the lack of a genuine commitment by the government to significantly boost the country’s defense capabilities. Instead, Chisinau continues to rely heavily on foreign assistance, which, though indispensable, is not a sustainable way to assure national security (Moldova.org, August 12). The United States government has been a major contributor to the modernization of the Moldovan military infrastructure, causing the ire of pro-Russian President Dodon, who is highly critical of the west in general and the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in particular (Noi.md, August 14). Illustratively, the opening of the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau has already been delayed by nearly a year due to the Moldovan president’s opposition and the government’s lack of political will (Ziarulnational, September 14). The absence of agreement between the president and the new defense minister regarding the national security agenda is likely to cause further tension going ahead.

The differences in viewpoints between the commander-in-chief and the defense minister could hardly be starker. Eugen Struza, who is also the vice president of the government’s junior coalition partner—the European People’s Party of Moldova (PPEM), led by former prime minister Iurie Leanca—promotes a manifestly pro-Western agenda. Sturza is making a political point by having announced that his first visit abroad will be to the NATO headquarters in Brussels, while the second one will be to Bucharest (Europalibera.org, November 7). Shortly after his appointment, Sturza had a phone conversation with his Romanian counterpart and met with the Romanian ambassador to Chisinau days later to discuss bilateral defense cooperation (Army.md, November 29). On Tuesday, Minister Sturza met with US Ambassador James Pettit and laid down his plan for reforming Moldova’s defense sector by focusing on updating a set of strategic documents (Army.md, November 14). Moldova’s draft National Security Strategy, developed under the previous head of state, Nicolae Timofti, was nixed by President Dodon. Nonetheless, on November 1, the government approved the National Defense Strategy with no input from the president (Gov.md, November 1), and the Military Strategy is pending approval. Thus, president Dodon is being excluded from the defense sector policymaking process (Timpul, November 7).

Yet, it is important to note that the legitimacy of the new defense minister (see EDM, October 24) as well as of the entire government (see EDM, January 21, 2016) has been called into question due to recent political scandals and maneuvering by the country’s major political players and institutions. As a result, implementing a robust reform agenda will be an uphill battle for Sturza, especially if contested by the popularly elected commander-in-chief—President Dodon. With Moldova’s austere budget, a significant modernization of the armed forces is not in the cards for the time being. Furthermore, as the army is not a significant political constituency in Moldova, the defense sector will likely remain little more than a political prop for the political parties waging an already traditional geopolitical tug of war during the 2018 parliamentary campaign. If nothing else, the repeated postponement of the opening of the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau is a vivid indication of the strictly rhetorical nature of many of the government’s pro-Western commitments. Eugen Sturza’s lack of defense sector experience notwithstanding, the young civilian reform-minded new minister is expected to try to maintain the issue of the national army on the government’s agenda. However, given that he and his party are only a junior coalition partner to the ruling Democratic Party, most of the important decisions will almost certainly not be his to take.

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Note: This article was written for the Washington based Jamestown Foundation and the original can be accessed here.