Tag Archives: Moldova

Change of Electoral Systems in EaP Countries: Bolstering Dictators or Causing Maidan


Before the Constitutional Referendum of 2015, Armenia was a semi-presidential republic. It had a semi-proportional representation underpinned by a majority bonus system. The unicameral parliament – National Assembly consisted of 131 deputies, of which 90 were elected on a proportional system and 41 on a majority bonus system, which rewards the largest party with the aim of ensuring stronger government stability. After the Constitutional reform of 2015, Armenia became a parliamentary republic with proportional representation based on one national and 13 regional multi-member constituencies. Yet, incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan, whose second term ends in 2018, is likely to retain strong influence over the political system by becoming Prime Minister (Ayriyan, 2016). The change of the electoral system and the reduction in the number of legislators from 131 to 101 (but may go over 101) is likely to facilitate Sargsyan’s continued grip on power.


Azerbaijan started off a unitary semi-presidential republic with a very strong executive and a mixed electoral system, whereby 100 members were elected in single seat constituencies and 25 on national party lists. Later, in 2002, a constitutional reform was adopted, putting the prime minister second in line to the presidency instead of the parliament speaker, thus creating the conditions for the transfer of power from then President Heydar Aliyev to his son Ilham Aliyev (Heinrich, 2010). The same reforms abolished the mixed electoral system in favor a majoritiarian one and eliminated the 50% turnout threshold for both presidential and legislative elections. In August 2003, İlham Aliyev became prime minister, only to win the October 2003 presidential elections. Another constitutional reform in 2009 further strengthened the president’s grip on power by allowing the president of Azerbaijan to serve for more than two consecutive terms (Gahramonova, 2009). The latest constitutional reform approved in a 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from five to seven years and introduced the office of vice president. Shortly after the referendum, President Aliyev appointed his wife Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice-President (BBC, 2017).


The bicameral Belarusian National Assembly is composed of the House of Representatives (lower chamber) and the Council of the Republic (higher chamber). The 110 Representatives are elected in single member constituencies, while 64 Council members (represent regional public authorities) are elected indirectly in seven multi-member constituencies, plus another eight Councilors being appointed directly by the president.  However, the parliament is only a rubber stamp institution with the president having a strong veto over the legislative process (Frear, 2014; Gubarevich, 2016). The vast majority of the directly elected legislators in the lower house are loyal to the president, who has considerable influence over the 94 independents from the total of 110 legislators, because the government routinely employs coercion to marginalize and criminalize the opposition’s mobilization efforts (Kulakevich, 2016). The remaining sixteen seats are divided among five political parties, which have very little impact of the political process. President Lukashenko himself is not a member of any party, but rather prefers to run as an independent.


Georgia is a semi-presidential republic. Its unicameral parliament of 150 seats is elected through a mixed electoral system (77 seats are decided in one nationwide constituency and closed party lists, while 73 seats a filled in single member districts). The country has had a relatively vibrant democratic experience compared to the three countries discussed above, particularly after the November 2003 “Rose Revolution” led by Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004 and re-elected in 2008. However, as he was approaching the second term limit, Saakashvili decided to maintain power by becoming prime minister. Thus, in 2010 Parliament adopted amendments to the constitution, shifting some powers from the president to the prime minister. However, by the time his second term expired in 2013, Saakashvili’s United National Movement Party had lost the 2012 Parliamentary elections to the opposition Georgian Dream Party. This was the first peaceful democratic transition of power in the country’s history (Lutsevych, 2013; Delcour, 2015). The Georgian Dream Party went on to improve its results in the October 2016 parliamentary elections, receiving 115 of 150 seats. Another four parties hold the remaining 35 seats, which makes Georgian Dream a dominant party. It appears determined to use its constitutional majority to further cement its dominance by changing the electoral system to a proportional one with a 5% threshold and the redistribution of the unallocated seats to the winner, offering the incumbent undue advantage (Gilbreath and Sichinava, 2017). Also, the Constitutional reform proposed in April 2017 would do away with direct presidential elections. Instead, the president would be elected by a college of electors composed of 300 parliamentarians and municipal council members, transforming Georgia into a parliamentary republic. Even if the proposed change of the way the president is elected would not go into effect until 2023, it is, nonetheless, viewed as an attack by the ruling Party on the President Giorgi Margvelashvili, who is independent (Larsen, 2017). In the short term, the reform could lead to consolidation of the ruling party’s positions, but it could also create room for political pluralism in the future.


After a failed experience with the soviet majoritarian electoral system used for Moldova’s first democratic elections, following the 1994 Constitution, Moldova became a semi-presidential republic with a proportional electoral system. However, in 2000, following an attempt by then President Petru Lucinschi to gain more powers via referendum, Parliament intervened and amended the Constitution transforming Moldova into a parliamentary republic, with a largely ceremonial president elected by Parliament with 61 of the total 101 votes. However, after two terms of domination by the Party of Communist Party (2001-2009), a government coalition created in 2009 by former opposition parties did not have enough votes to elect a president, which triggered a three year long constitutional crisis with a series of early parliamentary elections, a failed constitutional referendum, only to finally reach the 61 votes in March 2012 to elect a president. To avoid such difficulties in the future, in March 2016, the Constitutional Court issued a rather controversial decision to cancel parts of the Constitutional Reform of year 2000 on a technically, thus reintroducing direct presidential elections. However, as presidential powers were not changed, Moldova remains a parliamentary republic.

The 101 members of the unicameral Parliament are elected for a four year term in one national constituency based on closed party lists. The threshold has oscillated between 4% and the current 6%. The unallocated seats were distributed proportionally during the 2000’s, which gave an advantage to the dominant Party of Communists. After the opposition took power in 2009, the unallocated seats became distributed equally among the parties that passed the threshold, which benefitted the ruling coalition parties. Yet, the successive coalition governments were torn apart by infighting that produced major political scandals, culminating with a billion dollars or 15% of GDP disappearing from three banks on the eve of 2014 parliamentary elections (Rosca, 2015; Socor, 2016), which led to the jailing of a former prime minister and leader of the senior coalition partner – Liberal Democratic Party, and the reformatting of the ruling coalition. This led to the collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party at the hands of it once junior coalition partner – the Democratic Party (Independent, 2017), which welcomed defectors from PLDM and PCRM, thus becoming the main political force in the government, despite public support of only 4% (IRI, 2017). These and other developments brought increasing concerns about government legitimacy and even state capture (Tudoroiu, 2014).

Still, faced with low public support and realizing the diminishing chances of staying in power, in March 2017, the centrist Democratic Party proposed to change the electoral system from a proportional to a majoritarian one, only to settle on a mixed system compromise struck with the largest opposition party – the Socialists, that have managed to replace the Communists on the left wind of the spectrum. If approved, 51 legislators will be elected as before in a single national consistency on closed party lists, while the other 50 winners will be decided in single member districts in one round, which will allow the ruling party to employ its vast administrate and financial resources to gain undue advantage.


Ukraine’s Constitution provides for a unitary republic with a semi-presidential system. The constitution was first amended following the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 by decreasing the powers of the president, but it fell short of moving towards full fledged parliamentarism (Matsuzato, 2005). The rushed change was only aimed at overcoming the political crisis triggered by a contested presidential election, which led to the “Orange Revolution.” However, once Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, the Constitutional Court overturned the 2004 amendments, on technical irregularities, reinstating a strong presidency. This decision was highly controversial (Kramer et. all, 2011), since it cast doubt over the independence of the Court from the influence of the president (Minakov and Stavniichuk, 2016). Moldova appears to have emulated the questionable Ukrainian experience, when its own Constitutional Court, under immense political pressure, invalidated in 2016 a major constitutional reform from the year 2000 that had transformed Moldova into a fully parliamentary republic.

Ukraine has experienced all three main types of electoral systems. Much like all of the former USSR republics, Ukraine started off with the soviet majority (FPSP) system, but due to the double majority rule (50%+1 turnout and 50%+1 votes) many seats were left unoccupied. Discussions about reforming the system started as early as 1993, only to actually move to a mixed electoral system in 1997. The new electoral system undermined the nascent party system by bring 114 independents into Parliament after the 1998 legislative elections (Harasymiw, 2014).   Thus, the mixed system was used for just two electoral cycles (1998, 2002), only to be replaced with a full proportional system used in 2006, 2007 elections (Bader, 2010). Proportional system reduced the effective number of parties and brought some consolidation of the party system. However, as the ruling Party of Regions lost 3 million votes in 2010 local elections, President Victor Yanunovych, hoping to be able to use administrative resources to manipulate results in single member districts, proposed to returned to a mixed electoral system in 2012, under which half of the representatives are elected in one national constituency based on closed party lists, with a 5% threshold, while the other half are elected in single member districts (Harasymiw, 2014). Even though, there have not been major shifts in the effective number of parties, the third electoral system change in less than fifteen years appears to have reduced the turnout by about 8% compared to previous elections, which can be an indication of public frustration and loss of trust in the democratic process. System volatility also increased as two new parties gained over a quarter of the votes.

Not surprisingly, the ruling Party of Regions gained over half of seats in single member districts, while other parties were significantly underrepresented when compared to their results in the proportional list vote. It can be concluded that the Party of Regions archived its goal. Yet, one can only speculate what could have happened in a counterfactual scenario in which the fully proportional system would have remained in place. Perhaps, the Party of Regions would have lost the 2012 elections and Ukraine could have, therefore, avoided the 2013-2014 Maidan Revolution, the loss of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbas. One thing is certain, the country’s political elite is still guided by short term political expediency, rather than genuine debate on a long term constitutional design as was epitomized by the bill to introduce open electoral lists, which failed without proper consideration in 2014 (Interfax, 2014).



Meet Moldova’s New Parliament Members

Today is the first meeting of the newly elected Parliament.  It is the 20th legislature in Moldova’s history, formally counted from 1940, which is rather odd. Normally, it should be Moldova’s 8th legislature, counted from Independence Day and the adoption of the current Constitution.  However, in the current political climate, this is indeed the least of anybody’s concern, maybe except for the Liberal Party, which tried and failed to change the formal count in 2012.

The new set of lawmakers is not at all remarkable in any particular way. Precisely, only 61 are actually new, while 40 are incumbents. About a third of those 61 have been elected to Parliament at some point before.  These numbers are interesting to ponder on and compare with previous parliaments or other countries. First, I would like to consider the indicator that is talked about the most, albeit generally in vain – women representation. There are only 21 women elected to the new parliament. Still, that is an improvement from 19 in the previous one.  Ironically, Liberals are the worst at promoting women, while Communists are the best. In fact, we can see that right wing parties have a slightly worse record in promoting women compared to their left wing competitors. These numbers are a far cry from the modest one third quota advocated by civil society and light years away from the more equitable 50-50 representation, not even achieved by  Nordic countries – averaging 42% . To put things in perspective, women hold 18.7% of seats in the US Congress (20% in the Senate and 18.4% in the House), while the global average for singe or lower house is 22.2%. Thus, sadly only the Communists are above this benchmark.

Green – more women; Yellow – average; Red – less women.


Number and percentage of women in each faction.

Things are even worse when we look at rural vs. urban representation.  Hardly a surprise, Moldova is the most rural country in Europe – 57.8% of Moldovans live in villages. However, 94 of the 101 newly elected lawmakers live in towns and 78 of them in the capital. To make things worse, three of the seven ‘rural’ legislators come from central Moldova and only two from the north and the south. Even though the vast majority of MPs were born and raised in villages, they have since lost touch with rural life, which may be one explanation behind the medieval conditions in many Moldovan villages.

The other highly promoted indicator is youth participation in government. Youth are a key political demographic for parties right of center, namely liberal democrats and liberals. Yet, they appear to disenfranchise their electoral pools, as all three center right parties rank average in terms of youth representation, with Liberals doing especially badly, while Socialists lead the charge in promoting the youth, at least that is what the numbers indicate. Communists, with no young fellow faction members, have finally ‘accepted’ their gerontocratic label.  No wonder their youth wing – Komsomol, sided with Tkaciuk and the other rebels recently expelled from the party. It is interesting that three quarters of the Democrat faction are of middle age.  Liberal democrats are average across all age groups.

 Green – more youth; Yellow – average; Red – more seniors.


Number and percentage of lawmakers in each of the three age groups by faction.

The two youngest members of Parliament are Socialist Marina Radvan (23) and Liberal Democrat Mihaela Spatari (25). I cannot avoid mentioning the scandal that Radvan was dragged into when someone posted several photos of her on Facebook, presenting the would-be lawmaker in amusing, yet somewhat shameful circumstances. One side of the debate accuses her of ignorance and irresponsibility given her public profile (even though the photos were made before she became a politician, I believe), while her supporters said the pictures were doctored.  I, for one, am conflicted about the situation. Despite not having the full picture, I would strongly suspect that this avalanche of personal attacks and humiliation would have been avoided had she: 1. Not taken those incriminating photos 2. Kept better track of who has access to those photos and 3. Not become a politician.  Personally, I have a problem with all these conditions.  Yes, she made a mistake, but it was blown out of proportion and employed in a series of vicious politically motivated attacks, which is simply wrong on so many ethical levels.

The second youngest legislators, I have the pleasure of knowing personally. Mihaela is truly impressive in her drive to empower the youth. To my mind, she is probably one of the most professional and engaged youth leaders in the country. I am sure she will make a good name for herself in Parliament by not only being the voice of her party’s youth organization, but also the embodiment of all intelligent, enthusiastic and ambitious young Moldovans. It is important that all of those young lawmakers as well as the more senior once find their own voice first and learn to stand up for their opinion, particularly when it goes against the party bosses.  Unfortunately, the outgoing parliament has failed on so many occasions to protect the public interest that there is little hope of this legislature being any different, but it is not hopeless. Mihaela, and hopefully Marina too, are a small wave in a much awaited tide of change.


Note 1: These numbers are likely to change as certain lawmakers will refuse their mandates in favor of their current jobs, while some will take executive positions in the government.

Note 2: Association for Participatory Democracy is the source for most input data in this article. The team there does a great job of providing political junkies like myself with valuable quantitative and qualitative material!