Tag Archives: Moldovan politics

Șapte Motive de ce PAS-ul Trebuie să Meargă pe Calea Liberalismului Social

Unii vor spune că partidele din Moldova au doar o ideologie de vitrină și vor avea dreptate. Este un fapt bine cunoscut, comuniștii i-au încredințat fostului social-democrat Valeriu Lazăr și actualului socialist Igor Dodon implementarea unor reforme vădit liberale precum Ghilotina I și II, procesul de privatizare a domeniului public, deschiderea zonelor economice libere, taxa zero pentru profitul reinvestit etc. Coalițiile din ultimiii ani, preponderent de centru-dreapta, au ales, dimpotrivă, sa sporeasca provara fiscală și regulatorie, au tolerat atacurile de tip raider asupra proprietății private,  iar în locul unor privatizări transparente au ales calea dubioasă a unei emisii închise de acțiuni în cazul Băncii de Economii și concesionarea la fel de dubioasă a Aeroportului Chișinău.

Cu toate acestea, lipsa consecvenței doctrinare nicidecum nu neagă importanța ideologiei în sine. Dimpotrivă, acum, mai mult ca oricând, există o necesitate stringentă ca partidele să-și fundamenteze promisiunile electorale, dar mai cu seamă, acțiunile în domeniul politicilor publice într-o albie ideologică bine definită pentru a oferi o mai mare claritate, previzibilitate și sustenabilitate procesului politic și actului guvernamental. Prin urmare, elementul ideologic nu este doar o parte indispensabilă a luptei politice și, deci, a contrucției de partid, dar mai constituie un liant și un pol de atracție pentru membrii și simpatizanții acestuia. Astfel, elaborarea unui program ideologic calitativ trebuie să consituie o prioritate pentru orice partid nou. Viziunea doctrinară a unei formațiuni politice este, de regulă, o reflecție naturală a viziunilor politice și morale  ale membrilor grupului de inițiativă, dar poate servi și drept un instrument pragmatic de poziționare strategică pe eșicherul politic.

În acest context, Partidului Acțiune și Solidaritate i s-ar potrivi doctrina liberalismului social din următoarele motive:

  1. Însăși denumirea partidului indică o năzuință spre libertatea de a acționa, deci promovează un puternic dimanism economic și civic. În același timp, libertatea individuală este augmentată în virtutea principiului solidarității, ce creează condiții echitabile pentru valorificarea potențialului unam al fiecărui cetățean.
  2. Liberalismul social, fiind axat pe principii moderne postliberale, mai puțin ierarhice și anti-dogmatice, ar contribui la evitarea anchilozării vieţii de partid prin facilitarea apariției și menținerii unui mediu democratic și participativ în interiorul partidului în contrast cu toate celelalte partide one-man-show.
  3. Pe lângă combinarea oportună a mechanismelor de piață cu cele de stat în producerea de bunuri publice, liberalimsul social pune accent pe libertate politică, justiție echitabilă și democrație în procesul atenuării inechităților în societate. Acest aspect devine imperios în contextul contracarării cleptocrației de sorginte oligarhică.
  4. Liberalismul social reprezintă o nișă relativ nouă pe eshicherul politic autohton, dar care și-a demonstrat deja viabilitatea prin experiența PSL-ului (2001-2008). Popularitatea acestei doctrine este în continuă ascensiune  în toată lumea – Japonia, Europa, SUA. În plus, grupul partidelor centriste europene ALDE s-a dovedit a fi cel mai activ în promovarea relațiilor RM-UE, grație celor doi raportori ai Parlamentului European pentru Republica Moldova din ultimii ani – Sir Graham Watson și Petras Auštrevičius.
  5. Liberalismul social ar oferi PAS-ului un fundament ideologic distinct de celelalte partide axate pe socialism democratic (PSRM, PCRM), social-democrație (PDM), conservatorism (PN, PLDM, PPE, probabil PPDA) și liberalism (PL).
  6. Contribuția ideologiei noului partid la edificarea unei noi elite politice, mizând în mare parte pe tineri profesioniști, întrunind neapărat reprezentanţi ai minorităţilor lingvistice, care au preponderent viziuni de centru-stânga. Liberalismul social oferă o punte ce atenuează excesele liberalimsului clasic, vădit denaturat în contextul Moldovei, și social-democtrației sau socialismului democratic mult mai prezent cantitativ dar la fel de inautentic și extremist sub aspect (geo)politic. În același timp, conservatorismul moldovenesc pare să fie sinonim cu esecul politic, și, mai nou, devine refugiul populiștilor.
  7. Doctrina liberalismului social se pliază perfect atât pe profilul alegatorului de centru-stânga cât și centru-dreapta, oferind un mai mare nucleu electoral dar și mai mult spațiu de manevră decât orice altă alegere fără a cădea pradă populismului atât de nociv unui sistem politic în dezvoltare.

Iată doar șapte motive pentru care PAS-ul ar trebui să aleagă liberalismul social drept fundament doctrinar al noului proiect politic, care, în condițiile dăruirii de sine și profesionalismului membrilor săi, are  toate șansele să devină un partid ce va aduce schimbarea, asigurând o creștere economică sustenabilă, mișcând Moldova înainte, nu prin slogane sterile dar prin angajamente credibile bazate pe exemplul individual și colectiv de inteligență, integritate și consecvență.

Note for non-Romanian speakers: This article suggests seven reasons as to why, the currently under construction, Action and Solidarity Party led by Maia Sandu should consider social liberalism as the party’s ideological foundation.

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How international media failed Moldova’s protesters

Moldova’s image as the poorest country in Europe is rivaled only by its obscurity. In rare outbursts of international media coverage — often related to human trafficking, arms smuggling or mass protests — Moldova is depicted as a pawn on the regional chessboard, caught in a tug of war between Russia and the west. There is no denying that, in a world of realpolitik, Moldova is indeed a playground.

Yet there is more to this intellectual inertia than meets the eye. The sheer lack of nuance and insight displayed by the international media with regards to the latest developments in Moldova is as disappointing as it is predictable. 
Much in the way of confirmation bias is at work here — the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions. People are usually unwilling and, at times, admittedly unable to comprehend complex phenomena, especially when simple mental shortcuts are readily available.

Professional journalists and political analysts pride themselves on preventing or minimising the influence of such biases on their work. This is easier said than done, particularly in today’s world of ubiquitous geopolitical expediency. Moldova is a case in point.

Perils of European integration

Since the so-called ‘Twitter Revolution’ of 2009, Moldova has embarked on a path of economic transformation and political democratisation — or so everyone thought. The post-revolutionary government took on a rather inspirational name, the Alliance for European Integration, which proved to be both a blessing and a curse.

Generous western financial assistance and political support locked the United States and European Union into the costly self-fulfilling prophecy of a ‘success story’. But the success failed to materialise, despite promising beginnings. Five pro-European governments succeeded each other faster than the public could keep up with, and they spared no effort in building an elaborate discourse of European integration both at home and abroad. One could not help but be mesmerised by the audacity of Moldova’s leadership that promised to bring the country into the EU by 2020.

Over 100,000 protesters took to the streets of Moldova’s capital in September 2015 to protest the ‘stolen billion’. Photo courtesy of Maria Levcencova

Naturally, high hopes developed among more gullible Moldovans and international development partners alike. But the signs of trouble appeared early on.

As early as 2011, there have been hostile takeovers of privately held shares in several leading banks, known as the raider attacks. Then came the infamous ‘Huntigate’ scandal of 2013 — a cover-up of a fatal accident during a lavish hunting spree attended by the top brass of the country’s judiciary, including the Prosecutor General. Finally, ‘the billion dollar bank heist’ left the country perplexed as to how one could steal the equivalent of 15 percent of GDP from three banks with impunity.

Once a poster child of Moldova’s European Integration, Vlad Filat, former prime minister and Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, ended up a scapegoat for the missing billion. Meanwhile, Filat’s archenemy the oligarch and senior vice president of the Democratic Party, Vlad Plahotniuc, became the sole decision maker in the country.

By hook or by crook, Plahotniuc was able to create a majority coalition (which oddly bears no name). It was rushed to a vote in parliament as protesters gathered outside and soon started demanding early elections. This clearly begs the question: how can international media refer to the current reincarnation of previous governments as pro-European?

Monstrous coalition

Reports from Euronews, BBC, New York Times as well as Russia Today all described the new government as ‘pro-European’ — much to the bewilderment of Moldovan civil society. In a very heartfelt piece on his personal page, Dumitru Alaiba, a former economic and financial advisor to two prime ministers, urged international media and western politicians: “Do what you must, just don’t call this government ‘pro-European’. It is not Europe that they represent. And don’t call us, the people, pro-Russian either.”

Well-respected media institutions used a default template for covering Moldova, relying mainly on the fact that the new government presented itself as pro-European. A more astute analysis would indicate that the new government is ‘pro-European’ in name only.

After numerous Moldovan activists wrote public letters calling upon western media to take a more mindful view of the ongoing protests, a change of toneoccurred. There is now a broad acknowledgement that protesters were, and are, a distinctly heterogeneous group. Admittedly, many of them are pro-Russian, yet a lot are as pro-European as they come. What unites them all is a genuine frustration with an ad-hoc “monstrous coalition” government and a desire for a more democratic and prosperous future.

This is largely missing from the international media discourse, caught in the cross fire between Russia and the west. Russia has capitalised on the growing anti-European sentiment in Moldova, and by supporting these ruling elites, western media and western politicians have only vindicated Kremlin’s propaganda.

Another piece of the puzzle

Russia’s postimperial syndrome is built on the belief that the west is containing its resurgence by creating a belt of instability in south-east Europe — a mantra that rarely departs from Russian TV screens. Moldova is seen as just another piece of the puzzle. Moscow has a clear agenda of trying to bring Moldova back into its orbit and does not shy away from making its intentions known either.

For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 parliamentary elections, Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Russian presidential administration, attempted to broker a coalition deal between the Communists and the Democrats. In the 2014 campaign, Russia openly supported the Socialist Party.

The complexity of the Moldovan political landscape cannot be reduced to a mere east-west dichotomy

Russian media, which still holds a lot of sway over Moldovan public opinion, has been an indispensable tool in this process. Interestingly though, the rebroadcasting rights in Moldova for the most popular Russian federal TV channels are owned by so called ‘pro-European’ politicians, primarily Vlad Plahotniuc. He owns, among a few others, the Moldovan license for Russia’s flagship Channel One. Russian media coverage of protests in Moldova paints the EU in a negative tone, while reinforcing the message of Eurasian Economic Union as a better alternative. The aim of these reports may be as much to appeal Russia’s domestic audience as it is to influence public perceptions in Moldova.

This sort of nuance is helpful in understanding the complexity of the Moldovan political landscape, which cannot be reduced to a mere east-west dichotomy.

The same is true for the protest movement. Many things that politicians had kept to themselves, such as allegations of blackmail and corruption, came to light only after mass protests erupted. However, for a long time, protesters could not set their differences aside in order to pursue a common goal: early elections.

Even when they finally did, the much heralded unity of protesters across ethnic, linguistic, ideological and party lines proved too good to be true. The nascent movement is constantly being undermined by infighting.

Besides, there have always been doubts about the independence of such political players as the socialist leader Igor Dodon, Our Party head Renato Usatii, and front man of the civic platform turned political party, Andrei Năstase. Hence, the real tragedy is that genuine popular protests are led by less than candid individuals.

Bridging the divide

Instead of helping to bridge this divide, both media and politicians have contributed to the increased polarisation of public opinion by presenting just one side of the debate, reinforcing the ever-present confirmation bias.

This development is particularly visible when it comes to Romanian or Russian news reports, as well as political commentary on developments in Moldova. Self-proclaimed leader of the Moldovan diaspora in Russia, Aleksandr Kalinin, posted a Facebook video calling upon Vladimir Putin to come and rescue the Moldovans from what he saw as an imminent takeover by Romanian and Ukrainian special forces.

Protest march in the Moldovan capital Chisinau, January 2016. Photo (c): visual RIAN. All rights reserved.

The response came in a leading Romanian newspaper from none other than a prominent Romanian analyst and former adviser to Romanian president Traian Băsescu, Iulian Chifu, who called the video an “official request” to Putin. To his credit, Chifu went on to debunk Kalinin’s bogus allegations, but the latter was afforded much more attention than he deserved even in the aftermath of Crimea and Donbas.

The EU’s former enlargement commissioner Štefan Füle is perfectly right whenhe says that: “We should be more active in addressing [pro-Russian] propaganda about what the Eurasian Economic Union offers versus what the EU offers a country like Moldova.” Undeniably, Russian media will continue to produce characteristically biased reports about Moldova, but if western media want to have any claim to a higher moral ground they have to give up using simple shortcuts and produce accurate accounts no matter how tedious or inconvenient that may be.

Max Seddon’s recent article in the Financial Times, for example, does just that. He reports that “In private, some European diplomats say they would welcome a pro-Russian government — if only so that the current coalition cannot further tarnish the EU. Says one: ‘Asking them to do reforms is like asking turkeys to prepare Christmas dinner.’”

Who are the pro-Europeans now?

No matter how ironic it may sound, a pro-Russian government is likely to be the only thing that can rehabilitate the European Union’s image in Moldova. The risks of a new government changing Moldova’s foreign policy course are minimal: it would be economically irrational and politically suicidal, since most of the burden of adjusting to the new EU-Moldova Association Agreement has been incurred, while the benefits are only kicking in.

The new government cannot be called pro-European and, to its credit, it does not use the term. The coalition that Plahotniuc has put together literally has no name nor a coalition agreement. It relies on the program of the previous government despite being a “coalition of the willing”. Namely, the will of the 57 lawmakers being to preclude early elections and stay in power for another three years despite the sheer collapse of public trust after the infamous bank heist and the utter refusal to accept any blame either by the government or the parliament.

Moldova is a case study for state capture, though perhaps had Moldova been an EU candidate country, things would have been different via conditionality. The West has sacrificed democracy for geopolitical interests, which is usually a recipe for disaster down the road.

The sole threat of an imminent pro-Russian government is likely to galvanise and reboot the political system, albeit incrementally, with a new breed of upstanding young professionals exiting their comfort zones and entering the public domain to the benefit of their communities and their country — the alternative being a drift away from the values of democracy and the rule of law, all under the watchful eye of the international media.

Note: The original article was written for OpenDemocracy.net and can be accessed here.