Tag Archives: Renato Usatii

The Future of Moldovan Politics after October 30th

Lately, Moldova has been going through some major political transformations. Firstly, a directly elected president is, perhaps, the most obvious of several such developments. Another well documented process is the reformatting of the political spectrum both on the left and on the right. While something that is less apparent, the downfall of the Liberal Party implies the fading of unionism as a defining party platform. Thirdly, signs of de-criminalization of the political process, albeit through selective justice, are another major development. Last but certainly not least, the ongoing consolidation of Vlad Plahotniuc’s power vertical boosts the central role of the Democratic Party, which may be cemented further by a move towards a mixed electoral system.

Needless to say, a popularly elected president, be it Igor Dodon or Maia Sandu, will behave rather differently than has been the case with Nicolae Timofti. Yet, in the unlikely scenario that Marian Lupu accomplished his life dream of becoming president, we are going to have another Timofti type figurehead. Should Dodon win, Moldovans will be presented with an elaborate play in which Dodon will pretend to fight Plahotniuc, who will, in turn, pretend to oppose the Russian threat, embodied by Dodon. While, behind the scenes Dodon will continue to do Plahotniuc’s bidding in exchange for Plahotniuc using his power to shield Dodon from potential competition, be it the Communists or, even more so,  Renato Usatii. So that, after the next Parliamentary election the theater of the absurd can reach its climax by Dodon and Plahotniuc formalizing their relationship in an (in)formal ruling coalition.  Alternatively, should Sandu win, she will use her presidential platform to set a national agenda aimed at undercutting Plahotniuc’s power structure. Mainly, PAS and PDA will use their momentum for the parliamentary elections. Because the presidency, though symbolically important, is little more than a megaphone, which can be overpowered by even louder noise from Plahotniuc’s political and media machine. Winning the presidency is a major stepping stone towards taking control of Parliament in a coalition with the Dignity and Truth Platform, which has, so far, proven itself a trustworthy ally. However, even if Sandu loses in the face of Plahotniuc-Dodon political duo, PAS and PDA will still be well positioned for the upcoming legislative elections. Since not just Plahotniuc but also Dodon will become part of the ruling establishment.  This is only valid as long as the electoral system remains the same. In the likely scenario that Plahotniuc tries to introduce a mixed electoral system, which dramatically shifts the balance of power to his favor, Dodon will be forced to show his true colors.

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Even without the change of the electoral system, the reformatting of the political spectrum has been ongoing for some time. After 2009, the right wing of the spectrum was divided between PLDM and PL, only to be rehashed again between PAS and PDA. Interestingly, the apparent downfall of the Liberal Party, which polls below the margin of error, is particularly symbolic because it appears to drag down with it one of the main national political currents – unionism.  Supporters of the unionist movement have become utterly disillusioned with the Liberal Party and its leader Mihai Ghimpu, who, despite running for president on a vocal unionist message, polls at just one percent. Almost all of PL supporters have migrated to PAS, PDA and PD, neither of which are explicitly pro-unionist parties. PAS and PDA surely have a unionist wing, but they shy away from making unionism a key feature of their political identity and for good reason. Both PAS and PDA want to take the lead on the center-right, hoping to get the support of as many voters as possible, but a unionist platform sets you a ceiling of about 12%. It is still possible that the weaker of the two parties will embrace unionism at some point to cement its position, unless a new party replaces PL before that, perhaps one lead by current Constitutional Court Chairman Alexandru Tanase. Another public figure that Plahotniuc could employ for these purposes is George Simion, prominent unification activist, whom Plahotniuc has used before to galvanize unionist sentiments as a decoy during the turbulent coalition building process after the 2014 elections. In the meantime, Moldova remains without a standard bearer of unionism – a defining cleavage of local political competition. Perhaps, it is only natural since the Greater Romania Party has long lost its political importance in Romania. Whether we are entering post-unionist politics in Moldova is yet to be determined, but the implication for the left is apparent, once it starts to lose one of its own defining fear mongering talking point.

Meanwhile, the left wing of the spectrum has been slowly but surely metamorphosing from Voronin’s PCRM into Dodon’s PSRM, with the Democrats situated comfortably in the center. The meteoric rise of Renato Usatii did not fit into this plan. Usatii’s populist appeal was, in many ways, a problem for all parties, but mostly for Dodon and Plahotniuc.  If Usatii were to hold about 15% of seats in Parliament, then Democrats would lose their kingmaker position. Had Usatii not been banned from the 2014 election, we would now have a rather different picture, perhaps with Plahotniuc in a much weaker position or even out of power. That is why Usatii had to go. However, before we paint Usatii as a martyr, we need to be aware that Usatii had been in hot water before in 2014 and was even detained in October 2015 only to be soon absolved of all his sins by the same Plahotniuc controlled justice system. Conveniently, Usatii’s past dealings and present connections make him a perfect candidate for prosecution every time you need to distract the public’s attention from something far more important – say a crucial presidential election.

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Following the Friday arrest warrant issued on Usatii’s name for an alleged assassination attempt of a business rival back in 2012, Usatii will join a long list of high profile criminal cases. Note that even this time Usatii was allowed to escape to Moscow. In this sense, Plahotniuc learnt from his mentor Voronin, who eradicated or exiled much or the powerful organized crime that controlled the most lucrative sectors of the Moldovan economy, only to be replaced by white-collar criminals, who took control over key financial flows and soon became politicians or sponsors of political parties: Vlad Filat, Veaceslav Platon, Ilan Shor, Victor and Viorel Topa, Renato Usatii, Oleg Voronin etc. One could even say that Plahotniuc is making the country a favor by rooting out criminal elements from the political process, with one major caveat – Plahotniuc himself is more than worthy of joining the likes of Filat, Platon and Usatii. The only thing protecting Plahotniuc from a criminal case is his control over the majority in Parliament. Therefore, Plahotniuc cannot afford to lose power,  which  is exactly what Maia Sandu is determined to make happen. Will Dodon? We could soon find out.

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Vlad Plahotniuc for President!

There is increasing buzz about Vlad Plahotniuc’s presidential ambitions. After his recent PR offensive in Washington, where he met with Victoria Nuland and visited the IMF, he then organized a surprise Economic Forum in Chisinau, announced just the day before, with former EU Commission Chief Jose Manuel Barroso as keynote speaker. There Plahotniuc promised to maintain political and economic stability in the country. Doing so without holding any public office would be challenging, though not impossible for him. Still, all the time and effort he has been putting into building his public image lately cannot be explained by anything other than a drive for the highest public office. He may not have the best poll numbers, but neither are any of the other PD candidates doing much better. So, I would not be surprised if Plahotniuc made a similar tour de force to Kiev or even Moscow, since he is not particularly welcomed in Brussels. After all, he made sure to also invite a Russian guest, analyst Vladislav Zhukovskiy, on the panel with Barosso for good measure. Plahotniuc went a long way out of his comfort zone, craving for recognition. He did not put Filat to rest just to stay in the shadow.

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Having to come up with titles like Executive Coordinator of the Ruling Coalition is truly demeaning. He seeks the legitimacy that only comes with public office. He could become Prime Minister, provided that a docile enough president is elected to nominate him. But heading the cabinet is too much work and comes with huge responsibility, whereas the presidency is mostly perks and no hassle. Indeed, back in 2001 and later in 2005 Voronin chose the presidency over the much more powerful office of prime minister for the same reasons. Just as in Voronin’s case, Plahotniuc controls a comfortable majority in Parliament. Hence, he could control the prime minister from the presidential office. This scenario gives the president the ultimate power with little responsibility. Such a president can always throw the prime minister under the bus when things go south.  Plahotniuc would certainly love to be in Voronin’s old shoes. After all, he evolved from Voronin’s errand boy to now potentially becoming his true replacement. We can already see the power vertical than Voronin introduces being reinvented by the Democrats with many pf the same people. Though not impossible, winning the presidency is easier said than done even for the all mighty Plahotniuc.

Plahotniuc’s chances are very much dependent on how the field of candidates is going to look like. He would stand no chance against Dodon and a unified pro-European opposition candidate.  But if the center-right opposition ends up having several candidates, thus, splitting the vote, it could as well pave the way for Plahotniuc and Dodon in the runoffs. Defeating Dodon in the second round would be relatively easy, considering how polarized the society is, not to mention Plahotniuc’s financial, media and administrative resources. Yet, more importantly, Plahotniuc is likely to hold potentially damaging materials about Dodon’s personal and/or professional life, which once deployed could significantly damage his chances. Adding fuel to the fire, Ex-Ambassador and Democrat defector Andrei Popov recently speculated that Plahotniuc promised Nuland that Dodon would not become president.

As for the remaining field of candidates, the best scenario for Plahotniuc is a dispersed vote on the center right. He was quite blunt about it when he scorned the idea of a single candidate on the right and argued that every party worthy of respect should have its own contender. So far, things are looking good for Plahotniuc. Apart from Iurie Leanca’s announced bid, there is some indication that Minister of Defense Anatol Salaru could also be running for president. Salaru is a prominent figure on the right and has solidified his image recently with numerous visits by US and NATO military officials. Salaru could be a strong spoiler candidate, hoping to deny either Maia Sandu or Andrei Nastase a chance of getting to the runoffs, paving the way for Dodon and Plahotniuc. So far, there is little evidence to suggest that Nastase and Sandu are finding common ground regarding who should represent the pro-European forces in these elections, despite the fact that Sandu and her party are on a clear ascending trend, while Nastase and his team are stagnating. Notwithstanding, Nastase went on a populist PR offensive, inviting Plahotniuc to a one on one debate. Days earlier Nastase suggested that Moldova needs a president who is a fighter like Ex-Romanian leader Traian Basescu. Nastase obviously meant himself, but here is a candidate who Basescu would clearly approve of.

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PS: Presidential elections will inevitably be a confidence vote on the current government. If Plahotniuc were to win, this would not only consolidate his power, but would also be presented as public endorsement of the ruling establishment.  Whichever faction wins the presidential race will also be seen as a favorite for the parliamentary elections of 2018. The presidency itself is less important because of its largely ceremonial role. The only time a president can flex his/her muscle is during the PM nomination process, but after the Constitutional Court mandated the president to nominate whoever a parliamentary majority proposes, even that power is gone. A president can only dissolve the parliament when the latter fails to create a government or adopt any laws for three months, neither of which is likely to occur anytime soon. Therefore, it is surprising to say the least that the opposition keeps demanding early elections, when there is no legal avenue for that. Of course, calling for early elections is good politics in the short term, but very bad policy in the long run, because no matter who wins the presidency, the same parliamentary majority will run the show until 2018.

Renato Usatii’s “big idea” about a one decree president – meaning that once a president from the opposition is elected, he or she would immediately dissolve Parliament, triggering early elections. This may play well with the public, but will inevitably end up in disappointment as the President simply lacks such powers. A much more responsible and effective demand would be to grant the president discretionary power to dissolve Parliament. This would make a directly elected president a real player in the political system. It would also make it more difficult for a ruling establishment to steal billions with impunity and continue to stay in power. Plahotniuc should not have a reason to oppose a semi-parliamentary/presidential system, afterall Moldova hardly ever stopped being one, besides Plahotniuc already sees himself president – so why not? Dodon certainly would not mind. As for the pro-EU opposition, well, if they could not agree on a single candidate before, this would only complicate things even further. Ultimately, it is all about rising to the occasion!

PPS: The Constitution needs to provide clarity, stability and predictability, which it currently does not. The provision about national referenda creates one of the most striking inconsistencies:

141, 1 (a) a number of at least 200,000 voting citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Citizens initiating the revision of the Constitution must cover at least a half of the territorial-administrative units of the second level, and in each of these units must be registered at least 20000 signatures in support of the said initiative; 

It was written when there were 9 districts, while there are 38 now. The opposition would have been well advised to forcefully demand that this article be amended or interpreted. Instead, Nastase and his team gathered 400,000 signatures according to their reading of the law, hoping that the ruling establishment would meet them halfway. Needless to say it was wishful thinking. Advocating for highly technical Constitutional amendments is a tedious job and certainly not as flashy as simply demanding for the ruling establishment to step aside. Bus as no such thing has been achieved, protesters would have been well advised to be more thoughtful and less emotional about their political strategies. A good place to start is the  upcoming Constitutional amendment process accounting for the new way of electing the Prosecutor General. This is a good opportunity to also review presidential powers, among other things.